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 1. Introduction 
Wealthy individuals and institutional investors have been involved in hedge fund 
investments for a long time.1 Hedge funds offer various characteristics such as 
limited regulatory oversight, flexible investment strategies and strong managerial 
incentives that might have a positive influence on the performance of investments.2 
Their popularity reached its peak in 2007 when about 11,000 funds existed with 
almost US$2,200 billion of assets under management. However the consequences of 
the subprime credit crisis also affected the hedge fund industry. In 2008 the number 
of hedge funds decreased to around 10,000 and assets under management declined 
by 30% to around US$1,500 billion.3 The subprime credit crisis started in February 
20074 in the U.S. subprime mortgage market and has consequently not only reached 
the global financial markets but also negatively influenced the real economy.5  
Simply explained, subprime mortgages are loans to “house borrowers with weak 
credit.”6 25% of the entire U.S. housing mortgage market consists of subprime 
loans.7 During booming periods in housing markets and when interest rates are not 
rising the high percentage rate of subprime loans is not a problem, but as these 
circumstances disappeared, subprime borrowers were the first ones to default. Their 
default induced an implosion of credit structured products such as mortgage-backed 
securities or collateralized debt obligations and was the beginning of the subprime 
credit crisis.8 
Financial institutions create mortgage-backed securities by selling parts of their 
“residential mortgage portfolio to investors. The mortgages sold are put into a pool 
and investors acquire a stake in the pool by buying units. The units are known as 
mortgage-backed securities.”9 
                                                                  
1 Fung et al.(1999) 
2 Ackermann et al. (1999) 
3 Maslakovic (2009) 
4 Ryan (2008) 
5 Crouhy et al. (2008) 
6 Mah-Hui Lim (2008), p. 4 
7 Capell (2007) 
8 Mah-Hui Lim (2008) 
9 Hull (2006), p. 692 
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 Collateralized debt obligations are asset-backed securities10 whose underlying 
collateral is usually a portfolio of bank loans or bonds.11 
Although hedge funds exist in the financial environment since 60 years, it seems that 
never before that much attention was paid to them as in the subprime credit crisis. 
The reason for this is to a lesser extent the fact that some of them made devastating 
losses but to a greater extent their impact on the overall stability of financial markets. 
Hedge funds have not had a major impact on the emergence of the subprime credit 
crisis, as they had only approximately 5% of their overall assets “invested in 
mortgage-backed securities in September 2007”12, but the general proposition is that 
they contributed severely to financial instability in 2008 due to trading activities.13 
Consequently, some actions to change the legal treatment of hedge funds have been 
taken but further changes are definitely to come in the future.14 
The motivation behind this thesis is to give a profound insight on hedge funds and 
the changes they will face due to the subprime credit crisis. Furthermore, I am going 
to compare the performance of different hedge fund strategies to the performance of 
different stock market indices during the subprime credit crisis. This analysis will 
identify whether the investment in hedge funds during the subprime credit crisis was 
generally a good or bad investment decision. 
The thesis is structured as follows. In the next section I explain the meaning of hedge 
funds, illustrate their history and discuss their advantages and disadvantages. 
Section 3 determines in detail the different characteristics of hedge funds. In section 
4 I describe different hedge fund strategies and section 5 provides information on 
how hedge funds are evaluated. Section 6 explains hedge fund databases and its 
biases, and section 7 discusses in detail the hedge fund industry in the subprime 
credit crisis, short selling in this crisis and possible legal changes for hedge funds 
triggered by the subprime credit crisis. In this section I also analyze the performance 
of different hedge fund strategies during the subprime credit crisis and compare it to 
the performance of stock market indices during the subprime credit crisis. Section 8 
concludes my thesis and provides implications for the future of hedge funds. 
                                                                  
10 “An asset-backed security is a special type of bond backed by a collection of income-generating securities such as 
mortgages, car loans, or even claims on royalties from music.” (Reilly et al., 2006, p. 64) 
11 Duffie (2001) 
12 Maslakovic (2009), p. 7 
13 Maslakovic (2009) 
14 Please note that this thesis is based on legal provisions and a legal environment as of May 1st, 2009. 
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 2. What are Hedge Funds? 
2.1 Definition of Hedge Funds   
In the literature an overall accepted definition of hedge funds cannot be found, but to 
me the description of a hedge fund by Caslin (2004) is the most descriptive and best 
comprehensible one. He defines a hedge fund as an investment that is 
“characterised by some or all of the following features: 
1. hedge fund investment vehicles may not be open to the general public; 
2. the minimum investment may be very high by the standards of mutual funds; 
3. there may be a general lack of transparency regarding the investment 
strategy; 
4. long and short positions can be taken as a part of the investment strategy;”15  
5. leverage, which is the use of debt in order to acquire assets16, may be applied; 
6. “there may be capacity constraints on the amount of money that can be 
managed within a hedge fund investment strategy; 
7. the level of regulatory supervision of the investment vehicle may be low 
relative to long-only funds; 
8. fees are structured at two levels, namely, an annual management fee and a 
performance fee; and 
9. there may be a minimum investment time horizon before investors can 
withdraw their money or a rolling minimum notice period.”17 
Many of these characteristics of hedge funds are going to be explained in more detail 
later in this thesis. 
As we are going through severe changes in the financial industry, some of the 
characteristics of hedge funds will not be valid in the future any more. For instance, 
more restrictive provisions in order to better regulate hedge funds are considered to 
be introduced. Hence hedge funds will not be able to trade with such a lack of 
transparency, with respect to their investment strategies. 
 
                                                                  
15 Caslin (2004), p. 2 
16 de Brouwer (2001) 
17 Caslin (2004), p. 2 
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 2.2 History of Hedge Funds 
Although lots of people believe hedge funds are a recent phenomenon in financial 
industries, the first hedge fund was set up almost 60 years ago in 1949 by Alfred 
Winslow Jones, an investment manager on Wall Street. He applied a strategy which 
is still used frequently, where he bought stocks that seemed to be undervalued as 
well as “sold short”18 stocks which had been perceived as overvalued. He used this 
strategy in order to neutralise (hedge) investment risk and combined it with leverage 
and a highly performance based compensation structure which was unusual for 
those days but is one of the trademarks of hedge funds.19 
Due to its structure his hedge fund was exempted from the Investment Company Act 
(1940). Without this exemption he would not have been allowed to use short selling 
and concentration in certain assets of his portfolio or leverage. The Investment 
Company Act (1940) and other parts of the legal environment of hedge funds are 
going to be explained in section 3.7. According to Connor et al. (2003) Jones 
charged a 20% performance fee which is still a frequently used percentage rate that 
has to be paid to hedge fund managers. In order to increase the management 
abilities of the fund he also hired other managers and founded the first multi-manager 
hedge fund.20 
After some time Jones believed to be better off by changing the structure of his fund 
and transformed it into a fund of funds which invested also in other hedge funds.21 
His fund gained a lot of attention in 1966, when an article was published about it in 
the Fortune magazine, which reported on its great performance. It outperformed 
traditional mutual funds such as the five year best fidelity trend fund by 44% and the 
ten year best Dreyfus Fund by 87%. These results already included the performance 
fees that had to be paid to the hedge fund managers.22 
                                                                  
18 Short selling is defined and explained in detail in section 3.1. 
19 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
20 Connor et al. (2003) 
21 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
22 Loomis (1966) 
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 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two years after the 
article about Alfred Winslow Jones’ hedge fund had been published, 140 hedge 
funds already existed.23 
New hedge funds tried to copy the strategy of Alfred Winslow Jones, but most of the 
hedge fund managers were not consistent enough and changed their long-short 
equity positions into mainly long positions with a lot of leverage to take advantage of 
the booming stock markets of the late 1960’s. When it came to the bearish markets 
of 1972-1974 (the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index24 decreased by a third) many hedge 
funds made huge losses due to the changes in their strategy and dropped out of the 
hedge fund industry.25 
After 1974 the hedge fund industry declined and the public almost stopped paying 
attention to the industry, but due to the big success of Julian Robertson’s Tiger and 
Jaguar funds, hedge funds reappeared in headlines in 1986.26 According to the 
journal “Institutional Investor”, Robertson’s Tiger Fund earned 43% of compounded 
annual returns after incentive fees and expenses during the first six years of its 
existence.27 
Since then the interest in hedge fund investments grew rapidly until the year 2008 
which was a horrifying year for many hedge funds. Figure 1 points out hedge funds’ 
gains and losses in the period 1998-2008 and illustrates that most hedge funds made 
devastating losses in 2008. 
                                                                  
23 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
24 The Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) is a stock market index which “includes 500 leading companies in leading industries of 
the U.S. economy.” (Standard & Poor’s, link: http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-
usduf--p-us-l--, accessed: 22/01/10) 
25 Connor et al. (2003) 
26 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
27 Rohrer (1986) 
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Figure 1: Amount and Performance of Hedge Funds 
from 1998 to 2008 
Source: New York Times28 
 
 
In the first half of 2009 many hedge funds recovered from the previous year and 
performed positively again. The Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index returned 7.2%.29 
Recently, hedge funds are one of the main subjects of discussion for politicians and 
economists because they are considered as a threat to financial systems.30 Before 
the subprime credit crisis the discussions on hedge funds were mainly based on 
particular cases as for instance, George Soros’ Quantum fund and the Long Term 
Capital Management hedge fund, but since the beginning of the subprime credit 
crisis the whole hedge fund industry became a subject for discussion. Section 7.1 
explains the recent situation in the hedge fund industry in more detail.  
 
2.3 Reasons to invest in Hedge Funds  
According to Alexander M. Ineichen (2003) the value of any investment should be 
determined by prospective returns, risk and correlation to other investments. His 
opinion is that the diversification benefits and the potential to achieve high risk-
adjusted returns of hedge funds cannot be achieved with traditional investments.31 
                                                                  
28 New York Times, link: http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/01/17/business/20090118_HEDGE_GRAPHIC.html, 
accessed: 04/04/09 
29 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Mid%20Year%20Hedge%20Analysis_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 08/01/10 
30 Lutton (2008) 
31 Ineichen (2003) 
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 Magnum Funds mentions the following benefits of hedge fund investments: 
• “Many hedge fund strategies have the ability to generate positive returns in 
both rising and falling equity and bond markets. 
• Inclusion of hedge funds in a balanced portfolio reduces overall portfolio risk 
and volatility and increases returns. 
• The huge variety of hedge fund investment styles – many uncorrelated with 
each other – provides investors with a wide choice of hedge fund strategies to 
meet individual investment objectives. 
• Academic research shows hedge funds have higher returns and lower overall 
risk than traditional investment funds. 
• Hedge funds can provide an ideal long-term investment solution, eliminating 
the need to correctly time entry and exit from markets. 
• Adding hedge funds to an investment portfolio provides diversification not 
otherwise available in traditional investing.”32 
In a survey by Institutional Investor in 1994, institutional investors were asked for the 
reasons why they invested in hedge funds. Table 1 shows their results: 
Rank Reason  
1 Superior performance  
2 Diversification/hedging 
3 Access to modern techniques and markets 
4 Little regulation/high flexibility 
Table 1: Reasons for Institutional 
Investors to invest in Hedge Funds 
Source: Ineichen (2003), p. 135 
 
Apart from all the advantages of hedge fund investments, we should always keep in 
mind that they also have some disadvantages.  
 
                                                                  
32 Magnum Funds, link: http://www.magnum.com/About.aspx?RowID=14, accessed: 06/04/09 
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 2.4 Disadvantages of Hedge Fund Investments 
• The general aim of hedge funds is to deliver positive returns in rising and in 
falling markets. Therefore hedge funds do not always take advantage of 
growing markets but rather try to hedge long positions with short positions in 
order to be secure in falling markets. Hedge funds usually do not reach as 
high returns as long-only funds in rising markets but they still strive to achieve 
positive returns.33 
• Another drawback of hedge funds is the substantial manager-specific risk.34 
Hedge fund managers need a lot of knowledge, experience and discipline to 
manage such big pools of money with complex strategies and in even more 
complex markets. As positive market conditions do not challenge hedge fund 
managers to show their true abilities, it is very difficult to differentiate between 
a good and a bad performer. The greed of hedge fund managers can also be 
problematic for investors. The biggest part of a hedge fund manager’s 
compensation depends on the performance of the fund, which gives the 
manager an incentive to increase risk in order to achieve better performance, 
but often the increase in risk does not result in higher performance but leads to 
devastating losses of the fund.35 
• Hedge funds are usually run by only one or two key managers who are able to 
coordinate quickly and to make quick investment decisions. The disadvantage 
of a low number of managers is that one of them or even the only existing 
hedge fund manager might leave the company which would have a very bad 
effect on the hedge fund.36 
• The last drawbacks hedge fund investors are confronted with are low liquidity 
and low transparency in the actions of hedge fund managers.37 Those two 
characteristics of hedge funds are going to be explained in section 3.3 and 
3.4. 
 
                                                                  
33 Frush (2006) 
34 Frush (2006) 
35 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
36 Frush (2006) 
37 Frush (2006) 
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 3. Characteristics of Hedge Funds 
I mentioned above that I prefer the hedge fund definition by Caslin (2004) over 
others. It includes all important characteristics and those in the need of more detailed 
explanations are described in this section. 
 
3.1 Short Selling  
Short selling became one of the main characteristics of hedge funds and even if 
hedge fund managers do not use short selling actively, they hold options to short sell 
in order to hedge risk.38 
According to de Brouwer (2001) “Short selling is the sale of an asset, such as a 
bond, equity or foreign currency that the vendor does not own. The vendor first 
borrows the asset from another party, with the promise of repaying it back at some 
future time, and then sells it. If the price of the asset has fallen by the time the vendor 
is due to repay it to the lender then he can buy it back in the market for less than he 
initially sold it. The profit is the selling price less the buying price and the cost of 
borrowing the asset.”39 
The goal of short sellers is to buy cheaply and to sell at a high price whereas the 
unusual part about it is the fact that the sale comes before the purchase. Generally, 
short selling has been used since commodity markets exist. Whenever organized 
commodity markets were set up, traders tried to reduce risk by hedging prices. Some 
of the most legendary short sellers are Jesse Livermore, Bernard Baruch and Joseph 
Kennedy who actively started using short selling already at the beginning of the 20th 
century. In 1906 Livermore sold the stock of Union Pacific short one day before the 
terrible earthquake of San Francisco took place. He earned huge benefits from this 
horrifying event.40 
When stock markets are stable, short selling is seen as a mechanism to drive down 
economy’s welfare, as short sellers bet on negative development and falling stock 
                                                                  
38 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
39 de Brouwer (2001), p. 9 
40 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
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 prices and therefore harm the stockholders and the company.41 In times when stock 
markets fall, short sellers are seen as parasites who are the only ones who profit 
from the crisis. Short sellers are definitely not the most “popular” traders in the market 
because they take advantage of negative trends.42 
Proponents of short selling claim that it increases liquidity, facilitates information 
transfer and “improves risk sharing in the economy.”43 
Private investors as well as professional investors view short selling as highly 
speculative. In booming stock markets, losses for short sellers can be enormously 
high (far beyond 100%). Compared to short selling the biggest loss caused by long 
positions is 100% of the value of the stock because the stock price cannot fall below 
zero. The gain of the short seller is also limited to 100% although 100% gains are 
very unusual and even 50% gains are not very common. Due to the high risk of short 
selling the decision whether to short sell or not has to be thoroughly analyzed. 
Especially the overall market situation and the financial analysis of the company are 
important components of the decision making process.44 
The most difficult part of short selling is to forecast the exact point in time when the 
stock price is going to fall. Many short sellers carry out fundamental analyses and 
estimate the exact trend that the stock price is going to fall but often they short sell 
too early because they do not take into account that markets often react slowly.45 
As the short seller does not own the asset that he wants to sell, he is required to 
borrow it from some third party. This third party is usually a broker.46 In the hedge 
fund environment these brokers are usually prime brokers like investment banks 
which offer tremendous amounts of assets to hedge funds. Besides brokerage, these 
prime brokers also offer further services to hedge funds such as financing, 
settlements of trades, risk management or operational support facilities. Apart from 
the earnings from stock lending for short selling activities they also earn from the 
lending of cash to support leverage.47 
                                                                  
41 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
42 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
43 Charoenrook et al. (2008), p. 2 
44 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
45 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
46 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
47 Maslakovic (2009) 
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 Generally, the short seller is not required to make any new investments. He only has 
to hold cash or some other assets with high liquidity as collateral to the broker. If the 
stock price falls, also the collateral falls and the short seller can use the free assets 
and cash from the collateral to make new investments, but if the stock price rises the 
collateral that has to be provided by the short seller rises as well. The short seller has 
to pay all dividends during the period of borrowing the stock. For this reason he 
usually prefers to short sell stocks that pay low dividends. Mostly the broker is not the 
owner of the stocks but is also borrowing them from his clients.  
There are mainly two risks arising from short selling48 
1. The price of the short sold stock does not fall but rises. 
2. The short seller has to return the stock to the broker before he can close the 
position. 
The three biggest mistakes of inferior short sellers are49 
1. They analyze companies and the market situation too superficially before 
choosing the stocks. 
2. They short sell stocks of basically good corporations just because they are not 
performing well during a certain period of time. 
3. Bad Timing – They start selling stocks too early or in order to signal to the 
public that the corporation will perform badly and this way try to make the 
stock prices drop.50 
Problems of short selling51 
1. Historically, the natural market trend is a rising one which makes short selling 
more difficult. 
2. The short seller has to find someone he can borrow the stock from. 
3. The stock market introduces regulations to avoid short selling. 
                                                                  
48 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
49 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
50 Signalling information to the public is only possible if the short seller has lots of market power. 
51 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
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 Until 2007 the New York Stock Exchange only allowed the short sale of stocks which 
had already made an uptick (upward movement). This regulation was abolished, but 
the SEC thinks about reintroducing it in order to bring more stability into financial 
markets during the financial crisis.52  
The up-bid rule is an adaptation of the uptick rule, which only permits the short sale 
of a stock if a positive offer has been made. This rule was abolished as well, but due 
to the financial crisis the SEC is about to introduce it again. The SEC also considers 
introducing the so-called “circuit brakers” which come into effect when the stock price 
of a firm falls more than 10% in a short period of time. In this case the up-bid or the 
uptick rule would be applied for the stock.53 
Further aspects on short selling are discussed in section 7.2. 
 
3.2 Leverage 
As already mentioned before, the term leverage is commonly defined as the use of 
debt in order to acquire assets.54 Leverage is a powerful component of most hedge 
funds because it intensifies gains as well as losses. The use of leverage is one of the 
most typical characteristics of hedge funds. Most hedge fund managers use leverage 
actively to realize their strategies while others who do not use it actively at least hold 
options to be able to make use of it.55 
According to Liang (1999) leverage is used by 83% of all hedge funds.56 
Well used leverage can significantly increase the performance of many hedge fund 
strategies compared to the same strategies without leverage. Some strategies even 
have to use leverage in order to reach their performance goals. The more leverage 
the hedge fund manager uses the more he should hedge in order not to increase the 
market exposure of his portfolio. Hedging the portfolio triggers a negative correlation 
to the market, the returns will be more predictable and the portfolio should achieve a 
better performance in falling markets. Most of the hedge fund managers’ income is 
                                                                  
52 HFN, link: http://www.hedgefund.net/publicnews/default.aspx?story=9937, accessed: 12/04/09 
53 HFN, link: http://www.hedgefund.net/publicnews/default.aspx?story=9937, accessed: 12/04/09 
54 de Brouwer (2001) 
55 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
56 Liang (1999) 
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 predominantly based on performance. The more leverage they use the bigger is the 
potential that they will increase the returns of their funds and this way they receive a 
higher compensation. Therefore lots of hedge fund managers have the negative 
incentive to use too much leverage which causes huge trouble for themselves and for 
their investors if their strategies fail. Leverage cannot be evaluated as good or bad 
but it definitely increases risk and is a very powerful instrument which allows hedge 
fund managers’ strategies to have a stronger impact.57 
To express leverage usually the ratio of assets to capital is applied. For instance, a 
ratio of four means that for every dollar of capital, the fund has 3 dollars of debt or 
every four dollars of assets are supported by one dollar of capital. This defines on-
balance-sheet leverage, since capital, debt and assets are balance-sheet items. 
Providers of hedge fund data usually document leverage with the on-balance-sheet 
definition.58 
Another type of leverage is called economic leverage and arises from off-balance-
sheet transactions. Such off-balance-sheet transactions are for example short 
positions. If a fund does a short sale on an asset, its corresponding liability does not 
appear on the balance sheet because the fund borrows the asset and sells it, 
although it still has an off-balance-sheet position or an exposure. Economic leverage 
is used as a measure of risk. Many hedge funds do not have much on-balance-sheet 
leverage but possibly lots of economic leverage due to a high off-balance-sheet 
exposure. There is no comprehensive information available about hedge funds’ 
economic leverage.59 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), which was one of the most famous hedge 
funds in history, had a leverage ratio of 25 just before it collapsed.60 LTCM tried to 
take advantage of small interest rate spreads between debt securities within 
European countries. Its strategy was mainly designed to pay off small returns but 
with very low volatility. Hence, it had to use a lot of leverage to reach its performance 
goals. As the fund was managed by renowned people from academia and Wall 
Street, banks were willing to provide LTCM with almost limitless credit to a very low 
cost. “From 1995-1997, LTCM had an annual average return of 33.7% after fees”61 
                                                                  
57 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
58 de Brouwer (2001) 
59 de Brouwer (2001) 
60 Connor et al. (2003) 
61 Connor et al. (2003), p. 10 
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 but during the Russian debt crisis of 1998 it “lost 90% of its value and experienced a 
severe liquidity crisis.”62 Due to the significant losses and the huge amount of 
borrowed capital that it used to realize its strategies an “emergency credit had to be 
arranged to avoid bankruptcy, the default of billions of dollars of loans, and the 
possible destabilisation of global financial markets.”63 14 investment houses and 
banks provided LTCM with this further credit in order to liquidate its holdings.64  
 
3.3 Limited Liquidity 
Most hedge funds sell shares monthly.65 The liquidation of these shares usually 
takes longer. Hedge funds only allow their clients to liquidate shares after a pre-
specified period of time. At the start of the investment, the hedge fund usually 
imposes a lockup period, which defines the period during which the investor is not 
allowed to liquidate his share.66 
                         
The duration of the lockup period is usually one year but some hedge funds invest in 
venture capital, which have lockup periods of up to five years.67 According to the 
Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), venture capital is invested to finance the initial 
stages of firms which seem to have major growth potential. The investment horizon 
for such investments is usually above three years which is the reason for longer 
lockup periods.68 
After the lockup period has expired the investor can withdraw his share by giving an 
advanced notice. As soon as the notice is given the investor has to wait until the pre-
specified redemption period. The notice period is usually 30 days and in most cases 
redemption is possible at the end of every quarter.69 
                                         
62 Connor et al. (2003), p. 11 
63 Connor et al. (2003), p. 11 
64 Connor et al. (2003) 
65 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
66 Joenväärä et al. (2008) 
67 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
68 UBS, link: http://www.ubs.com/1/e/ubs_ch/kmu/foundation/capital.html, accessed: 23/04/09 
69 Joenväärä et al. (2008) 
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 The market tends to shorter liquidation periods in order to attract more investors to 
invest in hedge funds. Compared to hedge funds, traditional investment funds 
normally allow liquidation on a daily basis.70 
One year lockup periods are common for U.S. hedge funds, but offshore hedge 
funds, which are funds that are established in countries with tax neutral 
jurisdictions,71 usually have shorter lockup periods and therefore offer more liquidity 
to their investors. The reason for long lockup and redemption periods is that most 
hedge fund strategies would not be applicable if the manager has to consider 
liquidating unlimited shares of the fund on a daily basis. Hedge funds use less liquid 
financial instruments than traditional investment funds. They even invest in stocks 
and bonds in a way which would lead to huge losses if the contracts would have to 
be terminated preliminary.72 
Another clause which is often included in hedge fund subscription contracts is that on 
a single day no more than, for instance, 25% of the overall assets of the hedge fund 
can be liquidated. If investors would like to liquidate more than 25%, then the rest 
would be paid out on a later date or the liquidation would happen in instalments.73 
An advantage for investors is the so called “key man” clause which allows investors 
of hedge funds to liquidate their shares immediately (enough time should be left to 
terminate the positions in accordance with the regulations) if a manager in a key 
position dropped out, died or could not continue his work due to health reasons.74 
Liang (1998) estimated that hedge funds with longer redemption and investment 
intervals perform better than those with shorter redemption and investment intervals 
as table 2 shows. 
 
 
                                                                  
70 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
71 Maslakovic (2009) 
72 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
73 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
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 Monthly Returns and Investment Intervals and Redemption Intervals 
All 921 hedge funds have monthly returns that are net of all fees. There are 92 disappeared funds. Not all funds 
report the following descriptive statistics. 48 hedge fund indexes are excluded from the sample. All information is 
as of June 1997 
Panel A: Redemption interval  
Redemption Interval Funds  Return Std. Dev.  
Semi-annual  33 1.96 1.69 
Quarterly  269 1.53 1.66 
Monthly  308 1.26 1.09 
Weekly  48 0.79 0.96 
    
Panel B: Investment interval 
Investment interval  Funds  Return Std. dev. 
Quarterly  198 1.57 1.10 
Monthly  473 1.39 1.30 
Weekly 49 1.17 2.31 
Table 2: Comparison of monthly Hedge Fund 
Returns when Hedge Funds have different 
Redemption Intervals and Investment Intervals 
Source: Liang (1998), p. 30
 
On the other hand Joenväärä et al. (2008) found that longer lockup and redemption 
periods lead to excessive risk taken by hedge fund managers which results in a lower 
Sharpe ratio75 for these funds.76 
 
3.4 Conduct of Hedge Fund Managers 
Hedge fund managers try to keep their positions as secret as possible in order not to 
tempt other money managers to imitate their strategies.77 Keeping positions secret 
was possible before the subprime credit crisis because hedge funds were and still 
are treated differently legally than pension funds and mutual funds. But as a result of 
the subprime credit crisis additional disclosures for a better surveillance of hedge 
funds are under consideration. 
                                                                  
75 Sharpe ratio: Important performance measure for hedge funds which will be explained in section 5.3.1. 
76 Joenväärä et al. (2008) 
77 Ineichen (2003) 
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 Institutional money managers have to report new short sales of particular publicly 
traded securities and they have already been required to disclose their long positions 
in those securities.78 
I already mentioned above that short positions have to be treated in a more sensitive 
way than long positions. Many hedge funds hold short positions in illiquid markets 
which offer better earning opportunities. The risk of illiquid markets and holding short 
positions in those markets is to be squeezed out of short positions which might end in 
a disaster for the overall portfolio performance.79 
“A short squeeze occurs when the lender of the borrowed shares wants to sell the 
stock. If the short-seller is unable to find an alternative lender, the short-seller must 
repurchase the shares in the open market to repay the loan and close the position.”80 
The risk of a short squeeze can generally be reduced and controlled by not 
disclosing the positions to the market.81 
As a consequence of the subprime credit crisis, hedge funds will have fewer 
opportunities with short positions in illiquid markets because they will not be able to 
keep many of the new short positions secret. 
In normal market situations hedge fund investors do not receive confidential 
information from the hedge fund manager; especially not the current positions the 
hedge fund manager holds. Stockholders are in a similar relationship to a company, 
because they also do not receive important information like the company’s contracts 
with suppliers and its future projects.82 
Most future legal changes will aim to increase the transparency of hedge funds by 
forcing them to report on their actions. More transparency was already created 
before the financial crisis by institutional investors as they asked for more information 
about the actions of hedge funds due to their big portion of investments in these 
funds.83 
 
                                                                  
78 SEC, link: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm, accessed: 09/04/09 
79 Ineichen (2003) 
80 Dechow et al. (2001), p. 80 
81 Ineichen (2003) 
82 Ineichen (2003) 
83 Ineichen (2003) 
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 3.5 Minimum Investments 
Minimum investments for hedge funds are generally high because “the number of 
investors who are not high net worth individuals”84 is limited legally.85 A frequently 
used minimum initial investment is US$250,000 and subsequent investments are 
usually US$100,000.86 Hedge fund managers’ servicing costs are usually low 
because they have a small number of clients – all of them with large investments. 
This allows hedge fund managers to concentrate mainly on the trading and spend 
less time on fund promotion and client servicing.87 Fund promotion and advertising is 
in any case prohibited for many hedge funds because they are often organized as 
private partnerships which are not allowed to promote.88 
 
3.6 Fees and Management Compensation 
The high fees of hedge funds and the high management compensation for their 
managers are two of the main characteristics of hedge funds compared to traditional 
investment funds. They have a deterrent effect on many thrifty investors. Especially 
incentive fees, which do not exist for mutual fund managers make a huge difference 
because they are usually around 20% of the annual profits. Mutual fund managers 
usually receive their compensation from the management fee, which does not 
depend on the performance of the fund but on its volume. Therefore mutual fund 
managers generally receive a more stable compensation than hedge fund managers. 
Nevertheless, performance also matters for mutual fund managers as bad 
performance will lead to a loss of investors and consequently reduces the volume of 
the fund. In general, the volumes of most mutual funds are higher than those of 
hedge funds.89 
According to Stulz (2007), at year-end 2006 the largest mutual fund managed 
US$161 billion of assets and the largest hedge fund US$10 billion of assets.90 
                                                                  
84 Connor et al. (2003), p. 16 
85 Connor et al. (2003) 
86 Liang (1999) 
87 Connor et al. (2003) 
88 Ineichen (2003) 
89 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
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 The main focus of interest in hedge funds is the ability of hedge fund managers to 
achieve a good performance also in bad markets. The hedge fund manager therefore 
compensates himself with a big premium. In order to receive a big performance 
premium, managers might have an incentive to invest more aggressively and take 
excessive risk, however most managers have big portions of their own fortune in the 
fund. This leads to less risk taken by the managers as they are affected by the gains 
and losses of the fund as well.91 
Generally, hedge fund investors have to pay three different types of fees: 
1. Upfront Fee or Selling Fee 
This fee has to be paid in order to undertake an investment in a hedge fund but in 
most cases bigger investors do not have to pay it. It also has to be paid when 
investing in traditional investment funds and is usually around 3-5%.92 
2. Management Fee 
The management fee is usually around 1 or 2% of the volume of the fund. It does not 
depend on the performance of the fund and also exists for traditional investment 
funds.93 
3. Performance Fee 
The percentage rate of performance fees for hedge fund managers is often around 
20% of the hedge funds profits. In many cases a hurdle rate is used which only pays 
off a performance fee to the manager after a certain percentage rate of interest has 
been reached by the hedge fund.94 Often the return of risk-free investments, such as 
short-term government bonds, is used as a hurdle rate.95 
                                                                  
91 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
92 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
93 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
94 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
95 Connor et al. (2003) 
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 We can distinguish between soft and hard hurdle rates: 
1. Soft hurdle rate 
In the case of soft hurdle rates the performance fee is calculated on the overall return 
of the hedge fund after the hurdle rate has been reached.96 
2. Hard hurdle rate 
In the case of hard hurdle rates the performance fee is calculated by basing it only on 
the rate of return above the hurdle rate.97 
Therefore the hedge fund manager receives a bigger performance fee if a soft hurdle 
rate is used instead of a hard one. 
Another frequently used term in connection with hedge fund managers’ 
compensation is the high water mark principle which only pays a performance fee 
to hedge fund managers after the losses of their fund have been made up.98 This 
principle guarantees that the manager of the fund does not receive a performance 
fee for gains which recover losses from previous time periods.99 
In comparison to the high watermark principle, hurdle rates are single period 
mechanisms.100 Many hedge funds make use of the high water mark principle but 
only few have hurdle rates.101 
According to the New York Times in the year 2008, 66% of all hedge funds made 
losses which obviously also reduced the earnings of their managers tremendously. 
The pool of earnings for the 25 best earning hedge fund managers was reduced to 
half the size in comparison to 2007. In 2008 they earned together US$11.6 billion 
compared to US$22.5 billion in 2007.102 
These are still tremendous amounts of money for the best compensated group of 
managers but we have to consider that the earnings in 2008 were small for most 
other managers compared to their usual earnings from previous years. According to 
the Alpha Magazine the average wage at a hedge fund in 2008 was US$794,000 
                                                                  
96 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
97 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
98 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
99 Connor et al. (2003) 
100 Connor et al. (2003) 
101 Henyep Wealth, link: http://www.hywealth.com/en/images/insight/hedge_fund_outlook.pdf, accessed: 30/03/09 
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 whereas in 2007 the average pay had been US$940,000.103 In 2008 the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index lost 19.1% whereas in 2007 the Index gained 
12.56%.104 
Due to the high water mark principle, managers’ compensation in the coming years 
might continue to be low although hedge funds returned to perform positively in the 
first half of 2009.  
A problem with incentive fees is their asymmetry with respect to the performance of 
hedge fund managers. They pay off a premium to the hedge fund manager if the fund 
performs well but if it makes losses the manager is not penalized. For this reason 
some hedge fund managers are inclined to excessive risk taking which led to a legal 
prohibition on asymmetric incentive fees for consumer-regulated investment funds in 
many countries.105 
 
3.7 Legal Environment  
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in February 2007 the regulation of hedge 
funds has become a constant subject of daily economic news. One reason for the 
development of the crisis is definitely the superficial regulation of financial markets 
and the opportunity for financial managers to avoid regulations. Many people assume 
“that hedge funds are completely unregulated”106, but fact is that hedge fund 
managers take advantage of exceptions in regulations.107 Politicians all around the 
world are already looking for plans to regulate hedge funds and to make them more 
transparent to the public since they are seen as a threat to the stability of financial 
markets.108 Many hedge funds are founded offshore in order to take advantage of the 
legal regulations of tax havens and of countries109 which allow freedom in setting up 
the hedge fund. 
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 According to Fung and Hsieh (1999) the regulations are developed for the general 
public and are favourable for well financed and well informed hedge fund investors 
who enjoy exemptions from the regulations.110 
 
3.7.1 Legal Environment for U.S. Hedge Funds 
I am going to discuss the regulation of hedge funds in the U.S. in more detail 
because the U.S. is the centre of activities of hedge funds although according to 
International Financial Services London (IFSL) about half of the number of hedge 
funds was registered offshore at the end of 2008. The U.S. was the favoured onshore 
location, as it accounted for almost two-thirds of all onshore registrations, as 
displayed in figure 2.111 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Onshore and Offshore 
Domiciles of Hedge Funds 
Source: Maslakovic (2009), p. 7 
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 Almost all American hedge funds are organized as limited liability companies or 
limited partnerships.112 Compared to most American hedge funds most offshore 
hedge funds with connections to the U.S. are established as corporations in 
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands or in the Cayman Islands.113 
Limited liability companies and limited partnerships allow pass-through tax treatment 
which means that the fund does not need to pay taxes on its returns, but the 
investment returns are passed through to the investors who bear the personal tax 
burdens. In the United States, hedge funds usually try to find exemptions from 
different SEC laws.114 
Besides the SEC there also exists the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) and the Federal Reserve to oversee the financial industries. The SEC is in 
charge of supervising publicly traded securities, the broker-dealers which help 
making the markets for securities and the corporations which issue securities. The 
CFTC oversees the industry for futures115 and the Federal Reserve supervises thrift 
industry and commercial banking. Hedge funds are not governed by the direct 
jurisdiction of the above three regulators because they are private investment 
partnerships for most institutional investors and other wealthy “investors who are 
regarded as “sophisticated”116 and are treated differently from the general investing 
public.”117 
U.S. hedge funds look for exemptions from the Investment Company Act (1940), the 
Securities Act (1933), the Securities Exchange Act (1934) and the Investment 
Advisor Act (1940).118 The Investment Company Act (1940) was set up for mutual 
funds in order to protect investors from careless investment managers who would 
use too risky investment techniques (e.g. leverage). Exemptions from the Investment 
Company Act and its registration and disclosure requirements existed for funds which 
                                                                  
112 Fung et al. (1999) 
113 Lutton (2008) 
114 Connor et al. (2003) 
115 A future is a standardized exchange-traded contract, which requires the delivery of a stock, bond, commodity or currency, at 
a predetermined price, on a predetermined future date. (InvestorWords, link: http://www.investorwords.com/2134/futures.html, 
accessed: 22/06/10) 
116 Sophisticated investors are “investors whose ability to make informed investment decisions and to impose their own 
demands for information generally obviate federally-imposed disclosure requirements.” (Fraser, 2006, p. 806) 
117 Fung et al. (1999), p. 315 
118 Fung et al. (1999) 
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 had less than 100 investors.119 A change in the legislation “increased the exemption 
to 499 investors, provided each has more than US$5 million in assets.”120 
The most important law concerning hedge funds in the U.S. is the Securities Act from 
1933121, which requires companies “issuing publicly traded securities to register with 
the SEC and file disclosure reports, to ensure that these firms provide the general 
public with all relevant information.”122 A hedge fund is exempted from most 
disclosure and registration requirements when it claims to be a private placement. To 
obtain this exemption the hedge fund is limited to 35 “nonaccredited” investors who 
do not achieve minimum wealth requirements.123 
According to Fraser (2006) accredited investors are:124 
• Registered broker-dealers 
• Certain institutional investors 
• The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and other employee benefit 
plans 
• Organizations with tax exemptions and assets over US$5 million 
• Private business development companies 
• Trusts with US$5 million in total assets and investment decisions taken by a 
sophisticated investor 
• Certain individuals who are associated with the issuer of the private offerings 
• Individual investors whose net worth exceeds US$1 million 
• Individuals who had an income above US$200,000 in each of the two most 
recent years 
The easiest way to meet the requirements of the exemption is to make offerings only 
to wealthy investors.125 
The Securities Exchange Act (1934) empowers the SEC to regulate securities 
brokerage companies which trade on their own accounts and which face potential 
conflicts in the execution of customer orders. Therefore broker-dealers have the 
obligation to maintain records of their own as well as their customers’ trades. Hedge 
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 funds are exempted from the broker-dealer registration and its expensive reporting 
requirements, as long as their trades are on their own investment accounts.126 
The Investment Advisers Act (1940) requires managers of hedge funds or other firms 
and persons who give advice about security investments to register as investment 
advisers. Managers who are registered to this act are only allowed to “charge a 
performance-based incentive fee if the fund is limited to high net-worth 
individuals.”127 As stated previously the performance-based incentive fee is the main 
remuneration for hedge fund managers. Therefore they try to find an exemption from 
the Investment Advisors Act or to offer only to high net-worth individuals. A hedge 
fund manager is exempted from the registration of the Investment Advisors Act as 
long as he does not offer business to the general public or not to more than 14 
clients.128 The costs arising from the registration to the Investment Advisors Act are 
fairly high due to reporting requirements and associated annual fees.129 As a result of 
the increased activities of hedge funds, the SEC expanded the regulation of 1940’s 
Investment Advisers Act in 2004 by creating a compulsory registration provision for 
lots of hedge fund advisors.130 
Hedge funds which significantly use futures and commodities have to register at the 
CFTC. However, many hedge funds are exempted from several rules within the 
CFTC.131 
 
3.7.2 Legal Environment for Hedge Funds outside the U.S. 
As already mentioned, many of the non U.S. hedge funds are domiciled in tax-
sheltering countries as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, or the 
Bahamas. U.S. hedge funds often establish a complementary offshore fund in order 
to attract more capital without exceeding the limits of the SEC on U.S. investors.132 
In the U.K., the Financial Services Act of 1986 and the Public Offers of Securities 
Regulations of 1995 influence the establishment of U.K. situated hedge funds. The 
                                                                  
126 Fung et al. (1999) 
127 Connor et al. (2003), p. 5 
128 Fung et al. (1999) 
129 Fraser (2006) 
130 Fraser (2006) 
131 Fano-Leszczynski (2002) 
132 Brown et al. (1999) 
 25
 Public Offers of Securities Regulations make restrictions on how hedge funds are 
structured to be private placements and the Financial Services Act concentrates on 
restrictions for marketing actions of hedge funds.133 
Legal structures for hedge funds in other countries deviate significantly. For instance, 
in Switzerland a hedge fund has few legal restrictions as soon as it is authorized by 
the Federal Banking Commission whereas French hedge funds are greatly 
restricted.134 
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 4. Classification of Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are very heterogeneous entities which are difficult to classify. Instead of 
a generally accepted classification of hedge funds, many different parties set up their 
own classification methods.135 
In 2003 a working group was established by the Alternative Investment Management 
Association in order to approach a more uniform hedge fund definition. The working 
group consisted of 72 members but only 36 participated in a survey on the 
classification of hedge funds.136 
The results in figure 3 show that most of the participants used an internal strategy to 
classify hedge funds (50% of the participants applied their own strategy classification, 
47% used one or more classification systems from outside and 3% did not use any 
classification system because in their opinion they could not be classified). Entities 
which used internal classification strategies classified by geographical criteria, 
qualitative analysis and by many other standards.137  
No 
classifications 
3%
Using own 
(internal) 
classification 
system
50%
Using outside 
(external) 
classification 
system
47%
  
 Figure 3: Distribution of Sources for 
the Classification of Hedge Funds 
Source: Indjic et al. (2003), p. 2 
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 Most of the participants, who used outside classification, relied on one classification 
source whereas just a minority used two or more hedge fund classification 
sources.138 
Hedgefund.net
9%
Others
14%
CSFB/Tremont
27%
HFR
27%
MSCI
23%
 
Figure 4: Distribution of External 
Classification Sources  
Source: Indjic et al. (2003), p. 3 
 
  
 
Figure 4 shows that most of the participants of the survey used Hedge Fund 
Research (HFR) and Credit Suisse First Boston/Tremont (CSFB/Tremont) as outside 
classification sources for hedge funds. Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
was also used frequently as classification source. The “Others” category included 
Eurekahedge, the Center for International Securities and Derivatives139 Markets 
(CISDM) and the Cogent Hedge database.140 These outside classification sources 
categorise hedge funds by their investment strategies. Figure 6 illustrates the 
classification of hedge funds into different investment strategies by Credit 
Suisse/Tremont which was formerly CSFB/Tremont. These different investment 
strategies are going to be discussed subsequently in detail. 
 
                                                                  
138 Indjic et al. (2003) 
139 Derivatives are instruments that have their “value determined by, or derived from, the value of another investment vehicle, 
called the underlying asset or security.” (Reilly et al., 2006, p. 548), e.g. options and futures. 
140 Indjic et al. (2003) 
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Figure 5: Sources of Classification by 
Category of Participants 
Source: Indjic et al. (2003), p. 4
 
 
Figure 5 shows which group of participants of the survey used which kind of 
classifications and to what extent. Investors and hedge fund managers mainly relied 
on outside classification systems, while service providers (accountants, data vendors, 
lawyers, etc.) and fund of funds, which are funds that invest in different hedge funds, 
preferred to use internal sources.141 
I am pursuing a style classification of Credit Suisse/Tremont which, in my opinion, is 
clear and explanatory. Section 7.4 provides a performance analysis of hedge funds in 
the subprime credit crisis which is also based on the style classification of Credit 
Suisse/Tremont.  
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 Credit Suisse/Tremont divides hedge funds in the following strategies and sub-
strategies142 
Hedge Fund Strategies 
 
Convertible Arbitrage 
Dedicated Short Bias 
Emerging Markets 
Long/Short Equity 
Global Macro 
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Event Driven 
Equity Market Neutral 
Multi-Strategy 
Managed Futures 
Distressed Event Driven Multi-Strategy Risk Arbitrage 
Figure 6: Hedge Fund Strategies Source: http://www.hedgeindex.com 
 
Some providers of hedge fund data, as for instance HFR, divide fund strategies in 
more sub-strategies in order to be more precise. In my opinion it is too sophisticated 
to divide hedge funds into 34 strategies and sub-strategies as HFR conducts it.143  
One tends to lose focus on the overall selected hedge fund strategy when hedge 
funds are divided into too many sub-strategies. The advantage of dividing into more 
strategies and sub-strategies is definitely the fact that more precise strategy returns 
can be calculated.144 Hence there is a trade-off between the focus on the overall 
strategy and the preciseness of the individual strategy returns when the amount of 
strategies is chosen. 
 
                                                                  
142 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
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 4.1 Convertible Arbitrage 
Convertible arbitrage investors realize hedged investments in convertible securities 
of companies.145 The concept of convertible securities is fairly simple: “A convertible 
bond is a regular corporate bond that has the added feature of being converted into a 
fixed number of shares of common stock.”146 The terms and conditions of conversion 
are determined by the issuing company at issuance.147 
If the corporation’s stock price and the price of the convertible security “are not rising 
and falling together, there is an opportunity for the arbitrageur to take a long position 
in the convertible security, and a short position in the stock into which the convertible 
security is convertible. When the convertible security is selling at a price close to its 
investment value, and the price of the stock into which it is convertible is not at great 
discount, the arbitrageur may buy the convertible security and sell one-half of the 
stock short, leaving himself in the position of being theoretically long and short at the 
same time.”148 By applying this form of arbitrage the investor is hedged against both 
a rise and “a fall of the stock, and any rise in the convertible security will be a 
profit.”149 
 
4.2 Dedicated Short Bias 
“Dedicated short bias funds take more short positions than long positions and earn 
returns by maintaining net short exposure in long and short equities.”150 This strategy 
does not try to take advantage of companies that perform well but instead looks for 
companies in trouble or tries to uncover fraudulent firms.151 
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146 Calamos (2003), p. 2 
147 Calamos (2003) 
148 Calamos (2003), p. 2 
149 Calamos (2003), p. 3 
150 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/secure/en/indexperformance.aspx?indexname=HEDG_DEDSH&cy=USD, accessed: 
12/11/09 
151 Black (2004) 
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 4.3 Emerging Markets 
An emerging market strategy specializes in equity and/or fixed income investments in 
emerging markets around the world. Many emerging markets prohibit short selling 
and do not offer derivative products or futures which accomplish the hedging. 
Therefore emerging market investments often employ long-only strategies.152 
 
4.4 Equity Market Neutral 
Equity market neutral investors take advantage of inefficiencies in equity markets and 
usually their investment strategy involves having a balanced proportion of long and 
short equity portfolios within a country. Managers of market neutral portfolios intend 
to design the portfolio to be either currency neutral153, beta154 neutral, or both.155 
Well designed portfolios ordinarily control for market capitalization, sector, industry, 
and other exposures. This strategy also applies leverage to enhance returns.156 
                         
 
4.5 Event Driven Strategies 
Event driven strategies seek to profit from special events in the life of a company, 
such as reorganisations, bankruptcies or mergers and acquisitions. Considering the 
entire range of hedge fund strategies, event driven strategies have medium volatility 
and medium or low leverage.157 
 
4.5.1 Distressed 
The distressed strategy refers to a strategy where the hedge fund manager invests in 
equity, debt or trade claims of firms in financial distress.158 Typically these securities 
are bank debt, corporate bonds and trade claims, and to a lesser degree preferred 
                                         
152 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 17/04/09 
153 Currency neutral funds try to eliminate the fund’s foreign currency exposure. (TD Mutual Funds,  
link: http://www.tdam.com/Download/656-I.pdf, accessed: 28/09/09) 
154 Beta measures the systematic risk of an asset. (Hull, 2006, p. 742) 
155 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 16/04/09 
156 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 16/04/09 
157 Garbaravicius et al. (2005)  
158 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 16/04/09 
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 and common stock.159 Hedge fund managers using this strategy prefer the use of 
debt securities to the use of equity securities because debt securities are treated 
senior to equity securities which in the case of bankruptcy would make debt investors 
better off.160 
The securities of firms which require restructuring or legal action to revitalize financial 
stability usually trade at considerable discount and therefore attract managers to 
invest if they believe that a turn-around of the company is at hand.161 Managers 
investing in this segment should have sophisticated knowledge in the area of 
distressed securities because those investments definitely bear significant risk as 
many companies issuing distressed securities end up filing for bankruptcy. In this 
case some of the distressed securities such as common stock become worthless. 
Sometimes large investors like hedge funds try to have an influence on the 
reorganization process of the company by injecting new capital in the company.162 
 
4.5.2 Event Driven Multi-Strategy  
Event driven multi-strategy managers have the flexibility to invest in a number of 
event driven strategies. They take advantage of changes in economic cycles.163 In 
this thesis I am explaining in detail the distressed and the risk arbitrage strategy 
which is described in section 4.5.3. A combination of these two strategies in a hedge 
fund would be an example for an event driven multi-strategy fund.  
 
4.5.3 Risk Arbitrage 
Hedge fund managers using the risk arbitrage strategy take long and short positions 
at the same time in companies involved in a merger or acquisition. They typically take 
a long position in the share of the company that is going to be acquired as its value 
tends to rise upon the happening of the acquisition and a short position in the share 
                                                                  
159 BarklayHedge, link: http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-definition/hedge-fund-
strategy-distressed-securities.html, accessed: 16/04/09 
160 Calamos (2003) 
161 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 16/04/09 
162 BarklayHedge, link: http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-definition/hedge-fund-
strategy-distressed-securities.html, accessed: 16/04/09  
163 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/secure/de/indexperformance.aspx?indexname=HEDG_EVDRV&cy=USD, accessed: 
11/01/10 
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 of the acquirer as the share price of the acquirer tends to decrease as the event of 
the acquisition is taking place.164 The main risk of the risk arbitrage strategy which is 
also known as merger arbitrage strategy is the failure of the closing of the deal.165 
 
4.6 Fixed Income Arbitrage 
The aim of fixed income arbitrageurs is to profit from anomalies in prices of related 
interest rate securities. Commonly managers make trades globally in order to 
generate solid returns with low volatility.166 Rather than trying to guess movements in 
the market direction, fixed income arbitrageurs neutralize changes in interest rates 
and obtain their profits exclusively from their ability of identifying the mispricing of 
similar securities. Often the trades of this strategy entail futures and swaps.167 A 
swap is “an agreement to exchange cash flows in the future according to a 
prearranged formula.”168 
 
4.7 Global Macro 
Global macro managers hold “long and short positions in any of the world’s major 
capital or derivative markets.”169 Portfolios of global macro funds can include 
currencies, stocks, bonds, and commodities in form of derivatives or cash 
instruments. The positions of global macro managers indicate their views and 
opinions on the overall market direction. Most global macro funds invest in both 
emerging and developed markets.170 
 
                                                                  
164 BarklayHedge, link: http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-definition/hedge-fund-
strategy-merger-arbitrage.html, accessed: 16/04/09 
165 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 16/04/09 
166 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 16/04/09 
167 Nicholas (2005) 
168 Hull (2006), p. 757 
169 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 17/04/09 
170 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 17/04/09 
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 4.8 Long/Short Equity 
Long/short equity investors entail equity-oriented investments on the long and the 
short sides of markets.171 Primarily this investing strategy is used to take long 
positions in shares perceived undervalued and short positions in shares perceived 
overvalued.172 In comparison to the equity market neutral strategy, the aim is not 
being market neutral. Managers have the capability to shift from growth to value, 
from net long positions to net short positions, and from small to large capitalization 
stocks. They might also make use of derivatives for hedging. The focus can be sector 
specific as for instance long and short positions in healthcare or technology stocks or 
the concentration might be a regional one as investments in long/short European or 
U.S. equity. The focus on certain stocks of long/short equity funds tends to be higher 
than the one of traditional funds investing in stocks.173 
 
4.9 Managed Futures 
According to some parties managed futures are hedge fund strategies but others 
classify managed futures as an independent alternative asset class. Although I would 
not consider managed futures as a hedge fund strategy, I am going to apply the 
Credit Suisse/Tremont database in section 7.4 which considers it as a hedge fund 
strategy. Therefore I am going to explain it briefly. Managed futures invest in listed 
commodity and financial futures markets as well as in currency markets around the 
world. Managed futures managers are generally known as Commodity Trading 
Advisors. Trading disciplines can be discretionary as well as systematic. Systematic 
traders usually use market and price specific information to make their trading 
decisions (trading decisions are often made by computer models) whereas 
discretionary traders apply a judgmental approach.174 
 
                                                                  
171 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 17/04/09 
172 BarklayHedge, link: http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-definition/hedge-fund-
strategy-equity-long-short.html, accessed: 17/04/09 
173 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 17/04/09 
174 Reuters Hedgeworld, link: http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge_fund_styles, accessed: 22/04/09 
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 4.10 Multi-Strategy 
Multi-strategy hedge funds engage a multitude of investment strategies. Strategies 
employed in a multi-strategy hedge fund may include equity long/short, convertible 
arbitrage or risk arbitrage, but the fund is not limited to those strategies. The 
diversification in the strategies helps smoothing returns, reducing volatility and 
decreasing single strategy and asset-class risk.175 
 
4.11 Fund of Funds  
The fund of funds strategy is not mentioned as a hedge fund strategy in the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index but has become an interesting alternative to 
investing in a single hedge fund. This strategy invests in several hedge funds 
“selected, monitored and usually managed by an individual or a corporate body.”176 
The manager chooses the investment in different hedge funds and the allocation of 
funds to the fund of funds.177 
 
                                                                  
175 Eurekahedge, link: http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/04may_archive_japan_multistrategy.asp, accessed: 22/04/09 
176 Caslin (2004), p. 70 
177 Caslin (2004) 
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 5. Valuation of Hedge Funds 
The two fundamental factors when deciding on an investment are risk and return. 
Each has to be “measured to assess and understand past performance”178, and to 
persuade investors to undertake the investment. Of course, past results on risk and 
return are no guarantee for the later outcome but they might be a guideline for future 
investment decisions. Measuring past risk and return of investments in the case of 
hedge funds is difficult, as there is a “lack of standards on how to measure risk and 
return.”179 In comparison to hedge funds, in the environment of traditional 
investments such standards which ensure investors for fair and full disclosure of 
investment results do exist. Often the lack of standards in the performance evaluation 
of hedge funds leads to conflicts and disputes between different parties because the 
views on performance evaluation vary strongly.180 
 
5.1 Measuring Returns 
 
The simple net return RT1,T2 on a fund between time T1 and T2 ≥ T1 is defined as181  
1
12
21
T
TT
T,T NAV
)NAVNAV(
R
−=  
           NAV…Net Asset Value 
Even though most investors are used to annual returns, hedge funds usually report 
monthly returns.182 To annualize hedge fund returns usually the compound annual 
growth rate is calculated. This technique is able to calculate annual returns when the 
holding period differs from a year.183 
11 −+= yearoneinperiodsholdingofnumber)returnperiodholding(returnannualized  
                                                                  
178 Lhabitant (2004), p. 15 
179 Lhabitant (2004), p. 15 
180 Lhabitant (2004) 
181 Lhabitant (2004), p. 27 
182 Black (2004) 
183 Lhabitant (2004), p. 30 
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 When calculating average returns of funds the question is whether to use arithmetic 
mean return or geometric mean return.  
Arithmetic mean return is calculated as follows:184 
T
R
AMR
T
t
t∑
== 1  
Rt…Return in time period t 
   T…Total number of annual returns 
Geometric mean return is determined as185 
1)1)...(1)(1( 21 −+++= T TRRRGMR  
R1…Return in time period 1 
R2…Return in time period 2 
RT…Return in time period T 
        T…Total number of time periods 
Geometric and arithmetic mean returns give different results. Fund managers usually 
favour arithmetic mean returns because their results have higher values which make 
the fund look better. Yet, if the mean return needs to be calculated over several 
consecutive periods, the geometric mean works more precisely because it includes 
compounding effects.186 
According to an empirical analysis of Fung et al. (1997) the returns of hedge funds 
“have low correlation to the returns of mutual funds and standard asset classes.”187 
Their findings are based on the analysis of 3,327 U.S. mutual funds and on 409 
hedge funds. These funds had to disclose return data for at least 36 months in order 
to become part of the sample.188  
                                                                  
184 Francis et al. (2000), p. 316 
185 Francis et al. (2000), p. 300 
186 Lhabitant (2004) 
187 Fung et al. (1997), p. 277 
188 Fung et al. (1997) 
 38
 In Section 7.4 I will discuss in details the return characteristics of the different hedge 
fund strategies in the subprime credit crisis.  
 
5.2 Measuring Risk 
Analyzing funds entirely on the basis of their average returns allows making 
comparisons but basing decisions on returns alone is not encompassing enough. 
The behaviour of two funds with equal mean returns may be very different. Hence 
there is the need for some additional measure(s) which indicate189 the risk of 
investments. In finance, risk is “the uncertainty that an investment will earn its 
expected rate of return.”190 Generally, higher rates of return can only be expected if 
higher risks are taken.191 “Risk is often understood to imply that the uncertainty is 
measurable, meaning that the return has a known probability distribution.”192 Usually 
risk is measured by the standard deviation193 but there exist also other risk 
measures. Standard deviation is explained in section 5.2.1 and alternative risk 
measures such as downside deviation, value at risk and the concept of drawdown 
are explained in section 5.2.3. 
 
5.2.1 Standard Deviation and Volatility 
Standard deviation is the primary measure of risk for traditional investments. It 
measures the dispersion of a random variable around its mean, is commonly denoted 
by σ  and is defined as194 
2)}X(EX{EX −=σ  
             E…Expected value 
             X…Random variable 
 
                                                                  
189 Lhabitant (2004) 
190 Reilly et al. (2006), p. 47 
191 Dichtl et al. (2000) 
192 Ruppert (2004), p. 457 
193 Ruppert (2004) 
194 Ruppert (2004), p. 13 
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 The unbiased estimator195 of the sample standard deviation of returns is196 
∑
=
− −−=
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t,t )RR(T 1
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1σ  
       T…Number of observations 
      R …Arithmetic mean of returns 
When risk is measured by the standard deviation of the return it is called volatility.197 
Volatilities are usually expressed in annualized terms in order to compare them 
better.198 
Major drawbacks when calculating risk with volatility are: 
1. “Positive and negative deviations from the average are penalized equally in 
the calculation process.”199 
2. The method only makes sense if returns are normally distributed.200 Volatility 
values for investments can be the same even though these investments might 
have different skewness201 and kurtosis202 values.203  
“Because many financial market returns, especially those used in hedge fund trading 
strategies, are not normally distributed,”204 analysts should “measure how the returns 
to their investment deviate from the assumption of a normal distribution.”205 In order 
to do this they have to take the third and the fourth central moment of a distribution 
into account.206 
The nth central moment of a random variable X is defined as207 
{ }nth )X(EXEmomentcentraln −=  
                                                                  
195 An estimator is called unbiased if its expected value coincides with the real value of the (unknown) parameter which is 
estimated. (Ruppert, 2004) 
196 Lhabitant (2004), p. 43 
197 Ruppert (2004) 
198 Dichtl et al. (2000) 
199 Lhabitant (2004), p. 50 
200 Lhabitant (2004) 
201 Skewness is explained in section 5.2.2. 
202 Kurtosis is explained in section 5.2.2. 
203 Lhabitant (2004) 
204 Black (2004), p. 56 
205 Black (2004), p. 56 
206 Lhabitant (2004) 
207 Miller et al. (2004), p. 94 
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 The zeroth central moment is208 
{ }0 1=− )X(EXE  
The first central moment is209 
{ }1 0=− )X(EXE  
The lowest central moment of real interest is the second central moment, the 
variance.210 
{ }22 )X(EXEX −=σ  
The third central moment is called skewness and the fourth central moment is known 
as kurtosis.211 
 
5.2.2 Skewness and Kurtosis 
Skewness measures the degree of asymmetry212 of a return distribution around its 
mean.213 The skewness of a random variable X is defined as214 
( ){ }
3
3
σ
XEXESk −=  
 
 
 
                                                                  
208 Miller et al. (2004), p. 94 
209 Miller et al. (2004), p. 94 
210 Miller et al. (2004), p. 94 
211 Miller et al. (2004) 
212 Ruppert (2004) 
213 Lhabitant (2004) 
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 Skewness of the 
distribution 
Explanation 
Graph of density 
function 
Figure 7: Negatively skewed 
Distribution 
Negative 
Skewness 
A negatively skewed distribution accrues 
from many small gains but larger 
losses215  
   
Source: Dichtl et al. (2000), p.142 
Figure 8: Symmetrical 
Distribution: Zero Skewness 
Zero Skewness 
The skewness of a symmetric 
distribution is 0 (e.g. normal distribution) 
  
Source: Kohler (2002), p.259 
Figure 9: Positively skewed 
Distribution 
Positive 
Skewness 
A positively skewed distribution accrues 
from many small losses but larger 
gains216  
  
Source: Dichtl et al. (2000), p.142 
 
An unbiased estimator of the skewness of returns is217 
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       T….Number of observations 
                                                                  
215 Lhabitant (2004) 
216 Lhabitant (2004) 
217 Lhabitant (2004), p. 47 
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 Investors prefer positively skewed return distributions over normally distributed return 
distributions since positively ones have a higher probability for positive returns. 
Negative skewness might arise from funds which perceive significant event risk.218  
According to Kat (2003) the returns of hedge funds tend to deviate significantly from 
a normal distribution and expose, apart from the global macro strategy, significant 
negative skewness. These findings are based on returns of individual hedge funds 
from 1994-2001.219 
Agarwal et al. (2000) observed that all hedge fund strategies apart from the global 
macro and the short bias strategy generate negative average skewness. They based 
their survey on 586 hedge funds from the HFR Database and analysed these funds 
from January 1990 until October 1998.220 
Kurtosis “measures the degree of peakedness and heaviness of the tails of a 
distribution.”221 The tails of a distribution are the regions far from the center. The 
kurtosis of a random variable X is defined as222  
( ){ }
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σ
XEXEK −=  
Every normal distribution has a kurtosis coefficient of 3. The excess kurtosis of a 
distribution which measures the deviation of a distribution’s kurtosis from the kurtosis 
of a normal distribution is K-3.223 
An unbiased estimator of the excess kurtosis of returns is224 
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218 Black (2004) 
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 Distributions with positive excess kurtosis are called leptokurtic. In terms of shape, 
leptokurtic distributions have longer, fatter tails and are more peaked around the 
mean. A fat-tailed distribution has a higher probability of extreme values than a 
normal distribution. Distributions with negative excess kurtosis are called platykurtic. 
In terms of shape, platykurtic distributions have lower, wider peaks around the mean 
and thinner tails.225 The normal distribution has a mesokurtic distribution.226 Figure 
10 illustrates kurtosis graphically. 
 
 
Figure 10: Illustration of Kurtosis Source: Dichtl et al. (2000), p. 143 
 
According to Agarwal et al. (2000) hedge fund strategies show significant positive 
kurtosis values which indicate that many return values tend towards the extremes. 
They based their survey on 586 hedge funds from the HFR Database and analysed 
these funds from January 1990 until October 1998.227 
Kat (2003) found that the inclusion of hedge funds in traditional investment fund 
portfolios leads to significantly higher kurtosis. His findings are based on returns of 
individual hedge funds from 1994-2001.228 
I mentioned above that volatility is a good risk measure for normally distributed 
returns.229 Therefore one should check if the returns are normally distributed or not. 
A number of statistical tests help to solve this problem. A commonly used test is the 
                                                                  
225 Wikipedia, link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurtosis, accessed: 07/06/10 
226 Kohler (2002) 
227 Agarwal (2000) 
228 Kat (2003) 
229 Black (2004) 
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 Jarque-Bera (JB) test which includes skewness and excess kurtosis in its 
calculations and determines whether the data are normally distributed or not.230 
Jarque-Bera Test:231  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=
46
2
2 kurtosisexcessskewnessTJB  
This statistical test “follows a chi-square distribution with two degrees of   
freedom.”232, 233 If the value calculated from the JB function is larger than a relevant 
critical value which depends on the level of significance, “the null hypothesis of 
asymptotic normality is rejected.”234 For example, if the level of significance is 5% 
then the critical value is 5.99 and “for a level of significance of 1%, the critical value is 
9.21”235. The Jarque-Bera test is not appropriate for rather small samples.236 
 
5.2.3 Alternative Risk Measures 
Originating from the disadvantages of volatility as risk measure, researchers and 
investors developed alternative risk measures.237  
“Downside risk measures attempt to define risk more in accordance with the 
investor’s perception.”238 They measure only the variability of returns underneath a 
prespecified target because returns above this prespecified target describe rather an 
opportunity than a risk.239 One of those downside risk measures is downside 
deviation. The formula for downside deviation “is essentially the formula for standard 
deviation with the favourable deviations omitted.”240  
 
                                                                  
230 Lhabitant (2004) 
231 Vogelvang (2005), p. 115 
232 The degrees of freedom determine “the number of independent pieces of information that enter the computation of a given 
statistic.” (Kohler, 2002, p. 510) “For each possible number of degrees of freedom” (Kohler, 2002, p. 603) there exists a different 
chi square distribution. “Even though all chi-square distributions are skewed” (Kohler, 2002, p. 603) positively, “the extent of 
skewness decreases with increasing numbers of degrees of freedom.” (Kohler, 2002, p. 603) 
233 Lhabitant (2004), p. 48 
234 Lhabitant (2004), p. 48 
235 Lhabitant (2004), p. 48 
236 Lhabitant (2004) 
237 Lhabitant (2004) 
238 Lhabitant (2004), p. 50 
239 Lhabitant (2004) 
240 McCrary (2005), p. 119 
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 Downside deviation is computed as241 
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   T…Number of observations 
   Rt…Return in each period t 
   R*…Treshold return which is often set to the historical mean 
   return242 
Another, quite recent measure of risk used in finance is value at risk (VaR). 
According to Lhabitant (2004) “the value at risk of a position is the maximum amount 
of capital that the position can expect to lose within a specified holding period (e.g. 
10 days or one month) and with a specified confidence level (e.g. 95% or 99%).”243 
VaR is more often displayed in percentage rates than in total dollar amounts. Many 
financial institutions use VaR as their standard risk management tool. A 
disadvantage of VaR is that it does not contribute any information on the loss beyond 
the loss of the expected normal market conditions.244 
Another measure of risk is the concept of drawdown, “which is defined as the decline 
in net asset value from the highest historical point.”245 All historical returns, since the 
existence of the asset, should be taken into account when the concept of drawdown 
is calculated. However, when drawdown statistics of different assets are compared, 
the same time period should be used. Like the VaR approach drawdown statistics 
are also very often displayed in percentage rates.246 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont database includes drawdown statistics since its inception 
in 1994. It calculates an assets decline from its peak month in percentage rates and 
the decline duration as well as the recovery duration in months.247  
                                                                  
241 McCrary (2005), p. 119 
242 Scharfen (2008) 
243 Lhabitant (2004), p. 53 
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 There are several ways of declaring drawdown statistics. An individual drawdown 
refers generally to each losing period within an investment record. The maximum 
drawdown is the maximum loss that an investor experienced during a specific period 
of time. The uninterrupted drawdown determines the strength and length of an 
uninterrupted decline. The drawdown duration defines the time it takes to reach the 
original level after a drawdown. Hedge fund managers often disclose drawdown 
statistics voluntarily to indicate their track records’ quality.248 
 
5.2.4 Covariance and Correlation 
Covariance and Correlation are statistical concepts frequently used in finance. They 
quantify the linear interdependence between two random variables.249 
The covariance between two random variables X and Y is250 
{ }{ }[ ])Y(EY)X(EXEXY −−=σ  
Covariance is used “to calculate the variance of a linear combination (weighted 
average) of two random variables.”251 
The correlation coefficient between X and Y is252 
YX
XY
XY σσ
σρ =  
Correlation is covariance with the size effect removed.253 The correlation coefficient 
always lies between -1 and +1 where -1 would indicate a perfect negative linear 
relationship between X and Y and +1 indicates a perfect positive linear relationship 
between X and Y.254 
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 A positive covariance between the rates of returns of two investments indicates they 
“tend to move in the same direction relative to their individual means during the same 
time period.”255 A negative covariance implies “that the rates of return for two 
investments tend to move in different directions relative to their means during 
specified time intervals over time.”256  
Investors search for investments that are different from the ones they already own in 
order to benefit from diversification. Correlation identifies diversification benefits and 
should be taken into account when new assets are chosen for an investor’s 
portfolio.257 The decrease in correlation reduces the overall portfolio risk.258 
The rule of correlation is simple: “low correlation makes for good diversification and 
highly correlated assets or asset classes”259 should be avoided. To achieve low 
correlation, investors allocate assets among different asset classes260 and invest on 
an international basis as the correlation among international stock and bond markets 
is fairly low.261 Some hedge funds attract investors because of their low reported 
correlations to traditional investment products. Most hedge funds with arbitrage 
strategies show very little correlation to broad market movements.262  
Correlation is the right measure of dependence if the return distributions of both 
assets are normally distributed.263 Many hedge fund strategies do not express 
normally distributed return distributions, since they employ financial instruments such 
as put264 and call265 options or short selling which lead to return distributions that 
have a negative skewness and a positive excess kurtosis.266 Hence the correlation of 
hedge funds with other asset classes might be notably biased.267 
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 5.2.5 Beta 
An asset’s total risk can be divided into unsystematic risk and systematic risk. 
Unsystematic risk can be eliminated through diversification and systematic risk is 
“nondiversifiable” as it is related to the movement of a market portfolio and is 
therefore unavoidable.268 According to Reilly et al. (2006), beta is defined as “a 
standardized measure of systematic risk based on an asset’s covariance with the 
market portfolio.”269  
Beta of asset X is defined by the following equation:270  
2
M
xM
x σ
σβ =  
σ xM...Covariance between the returns on the xth asset and the market portfolio 
       σ M...Variance of the market portfolio 
Stock market indices are often used as a proxy for the market portfolio. A fund’s 
“beta is calculated through a regression between the returns of the fund and returns 
on”271 a benchmark. If a fund performs identically to the benchmark it has a beta 
value of 1.0 (e.g.: The fund should increase by 10% when the benchmark increases 
by 10%).272 Funds with beta values greater than 1.0 are considered as aggressive 
and funds with beta values less than 1.0 are considered as not aggressive.273 
 
5.3 Risk-adjusted Performance Measures 
Many valuations of hedge funds entirely concentrate on their total returns without 
considering risk measures or risk-adjusted performance. Risk-adjusted performance 
measures help to compare funds with different risk characteristics.274 The four most 
applied risk-adjusted performance measures are the Sharpe ratio, the Sortino ratio, 
the Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha. 
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 5.3.1 Sharpe Ratio  
The Sharpe ratio, which was formulated in 1966 by Nobel Prize winner William 
Sharpe is the most frequently used risk-adjusted performance measure.275 It 
measures the excess return of a portfolio compared to the return on a risk-free asset 
per unit of volatility. “It is calculated by dividing the excess return of the fund by its 
volatility.”276 
P
FP
P
RRratioSharpe σ
−=  
   RP…Average Return on portfolio P 
       RF…Return on a risk-free asset 
      Pσ …Standard deviation of returns on portfolio P 
A high value of the Sharpe ratio indicates that the fund generated “a high return for 
its level of volatility.”277 If the Sharpe ratio is 1.0, the return is matching the risk taken 
to achieve that return and if the Sharpe ratio is lower than 1.0, the return on 
investment is lower than the obtained risk.278 It is very important which risk-free rate 
is used for the calculation because if different risk-free rates are used, the Sharpe 
ratios of two funds cannot be compared correctly.279  
In theory the risk-free rate is “the rate at which money is borrowed or lent when there 
is no credit risk, so that the money is certain to be repaid.”280 In practice “the risk-free 
rate does not exist because even the safest investments carry a very small amount of 
risk.”281 Still, most financial institutions assume that the interest rates on treasury 
bonds and treasury bills “are the correct benchmark risk-free rates.”282 Risk-free 
rates of interest vary from market to market.  
According to Black (2004) the Sharpe ratios of absolute-return funds such as hedge 
funds should be significantly higher than the Sharpe ratios of traditional investment 
funds and relative-return funds.283 In comparison to traditional investment funds 
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 absolute-return funds do not try to achieve investment returns relative to a 
benchmark, but try to earn positive returns in rising and falling markets.284 Hence 
absolute-return strategies try to outperform the risk-free rate in every time period. 
Frequently relative-return strategies are more volatile. Therefore they often fail to 
outperform the risk-free rate of interest and show negative returns which both 
produce a negative Sharpe ratio. This implies that the Sharpe ratio of absolute-return 
funds will be positive in more periods than the Sharpe ratio of relative-return funds.285 
According to Liang (1999), the Sharpe ratios of hedge funds are higher than the 
Sharpe ratios of mutual funds. In his study he found that hedge funds have an 
average Sharpe ratio of 0,364 and mutual funds of 0,168. His findings are based on 
385 hedge funds from the HFR database and 4,776 mutual funds from the Morning 
Star Inc. database. He analyzed these funds between January 1994 and December 
1996.286 
 
5.3.2 Sortino Ratio 
The Sortino ratio is “calculated as the returns in excess of the risk-free rate divided by 
the downside deviation of returns.”287 In comparison to the Sharpe ratio it only 
includes downside risk in its calculations. The Sortino ratio identifies funds with high 
upside volatility better than the Sharpe ratio. In comparison to the Sharpe ratio, the 
Sortino ratio has higher values because the used risk measure includes only a part of 
the overall deviations from the mean in the calculation.288 
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 It is defined by the following expression:289  
P
FP
deviationdownside
RRratioSortino −=  
The Sortino ratio and the Sharpe ratio tend to rank hedge fund strategies in a very 
similar way.290 
 
5.3.3 Treynor Ratio 
The Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha both are based on the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM).291 
The Treynor ratio is calculated by “dividing the return in excess of the risk-free rate by 
the beta of the fund:”292 
P
FP RRratioTreynor β
−=  
The Treynor ratio is not an appropriate risk-adjusted performance measure for many 
hedge funds because many hedge fund strategies do not have a benchmark, or the 
returns of “these strategies are uncorrelated to traditional benchmarks”293 which 
results in a beta that is close to zero. Therefore “a measure that computes the risk of 
the fund using only beta will be inappropriate.”294 Nonetheless, the Treynor ratio is a 
quite appropriate performance measure for long-only hedge funds which are 
benchmarked to traditional investment indices.295 
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 5.3.4 Jensen’s Alpha 
CAPM declares that in market equilibrium all assets lie on the Security Market Line if 
they are priced fairly, see figure 11. 
Beta 
Risk  
free 
Market 
Security Market Line 
Average return 
        1 
 
Figure 11: Security Market Line Source: Lhabitiant (2004), p. 71 
 
If the return of an asset is higher than it is supposed to be for the given beta, 
investors will be inclined to buy the asset, which will drive the price up, lower the 
return and return it to the Security Market Line. If an asset is located below the 
Security Market Line, investors will be inclined to sell the asset which will drive the 
price down, increase the return and return the asset to the Security Market Line.296 
Active fund managers typically search for assets which deviate from the Security 
Market Line. They try to identify these assets and attempt to profit from the 
mispricing. The returns of successful managers will be above the returns that could 
be expected for the given level of market risk and the returns of unsuccessful 
managers will be below the returns that could be expected for the given level of 
market risk. Consequently the portfolios of good managers will lie above the Security 
                                                                  
296 Lhabitant (2004) 
 53
 Market Line and the portfolios of bad managers will lie below the Security Market 
Line.297  
Jensen’s alpha measures performance based on the theory above as it “is defined as 
the difference between the realized return and the return predicted by the CAPM.”298 
)( P
CAPM
PP RER −=α  
Equivalent to the other ratios a higher value of Jensen’s alpha indicates a better risk-
adjusted performance than a lower value.299 According to Black (2004) Jensen’s 
alpha is a good measure to find out which manager has the greatest skills.300 
 
5.3.5 Comparing Risk-adjusted Performance Measures 
Funds are often ranked differently depending on the used risk-adjusted performance 
measures.301 
Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha evolved “from the CAPM and measure risk the 
same way.”302 Jensen’s alpha provides less information than the Treynor ratio. “Two 
securities with different risk levels that provide the same excess returns over the 
same period”303 may have the same Jensen’s alpha but may “differ with respect to 
the Treynor ratio. The difference comes from the fact that the Treynor ratio provides 
the performance of the portfolio per unit of systematic risk.”304  
The Sharpe ratio and the Sortino ratio focus on different types of risk. In comparison 
to the Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha which concentrate on systematic risk, the 
Sharpe ratio focuses on total risk and the Sortino ratio concentrates on downside 
risk.305 The Sharpe ratio ranks funds very similar as the Sortino ratio306 but different 
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 than the Jensen’s alpha and the Treynor ratio. The Sharpe ratio “penalizes funds that 
have a high volatility and therefore funds that have non-systematic risk.”307 
All four measures will only have similar rankings if well-diversified traditional portfolios 
are compared to each other as the majority of risk of the portfolios will be 
systematic.308  
Hedge funds usually have a large non-systematic risk component which results in 
very different rankings of the hedge funds between the performance measures.309 
If an entire portfolio is evaluated, the Sharpe ratio should be chosen as performance 
measure. It does not require beta estimates, penalizes portfolios for not being 
diversified and is simple to calculate. To evaluate funds or securities for a possible 
inclusion in a portfolio, either the Jensen’s alpha or the Treynor ratio is appropriate. 
However, the Jensen’s alpha and the Treynor ratio require beta estimates “and 
assume that the master portfolio is well diversified.”310  
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 6. Databases and Biases  
As already mentioned before, it is fairly difficult to collect proper information on 
operations of single hedge funds or accurate statistics on the overall industry. In 
terms of visibility it is important for hedge funds to be part of databases as advertising 
is not allowed. Hence many hedge funds send monthly return data to specialized 
databases like Eurekahedge or HFR. These data providers collect the information 
and sell it to anyone who is interested in purchasing it. Usually they also calculate 
various hedge fund indices which are extensively used to validate the superiority over 
mutual funds, for benchmarking and strategic asset allocation.311 
Unfortunately, these hedge fund databases are not inevitably representative for the 
whole hedge fund spectrum. Each database and index is set up from different hedge 
funds and is often constructed in diverse ways. Database providers establish 
different rules to decide whether a hedge fund is included in the hedge fund index or 
not. Often these rules are based on a minimum asset size and a minimum track 
record of the fund.312  
In order to be included in the HFRX Index of the HFR database, a hedge fund must 
have at least US$50 million of assets under management and a track record of at 
least 24 months. Furthermore the funds have to report monthly performance and 
monthly assets under management in US dollar.313 
In order to be included in an index of the Credit Suisse/Tremont database, a hedge 
fund must also have at least US$50 million of assets under management, but it must 
only have a track record of at least 12 months. Additionally, the hedge fund must 
have an audited financial statement.314 
“The biases in hedge fund data come from two main sources. First, there are the 
biases in the way each database is constructed”315 and second, there are the biases 
that result from “managed” fund prices. Some of the biases in the construction of the 
databases result due to inherent data collecting processes. These biases can only be 
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 eliminated by costly and complicated calculations but even then some of them will 
subsist, as it remains impossible to observe the entire spectrum of hedge funds.316 
“Managed” fund prices are reported directly by the managers and are often biased 
favourable for the managers.317 Section 6.1 to 6.4 explains different biases and their 
development in detail. 
 
6.1 Self-selection Bias 
Hedge funds do not have to disclose information on assets or performance to anyone 
besides their current investors and hedge fund managers themselves decide which 
information is provided in prospectuses of the hedge fund. The information offered to 
data providers is given voluntarily; hence the observed sample of funds will not 
constitute the “true random sample of the general population.”318 As the performance 
and characteristics of reporting funds might differ from the non-reporting funds, 
biases are likely to arise. On the one hand, smaller funds with profitable track records 
certainly have an incentive to be published in databases, in order to increase the 
visibility of their funds and attract new investors. On the other hand, hedge funds with 
under average performance will not report to databases as they avoid the 
comparison with superior performing peers. Therefore we could conclude that good 
funds report and bad funds do not report, however there is also a large group of 
extremely good hedge fund managers that do not deliver reports to data providers 
“because they do not need to or do not want to.”319 
Another bias accrues from the fact that hedge fund managers normally “report to one 
or two databases”320, but hardly to all existing databases.321 
 
6.2 Survivorship Bias  
Survivorship bias arises from the fact that historical data from disappeared funds are 
excluded from performance databases and studies. However, the performance of 
                                                                  
316 Lhabitant (2004) 
317 Lhabitant (2004) 
318 Lhabitant (2004), p. 89 
319 Lhabitant (2004), p. 89 
320 Lhabitant (2004), p. 90 
321 Lhabitant (2004) 
 57
 disappeared funds should be kept within the database because otherwise the 
database will be biased. Reasons for funds to disappear from databases might be 
the liquidation of a fund due to sudden and large losses, the merging of a fund with 
another fund or the closing of a fund due to a long period of losses.322 Survivorship 
bias can be calculated as the difference between the average return of all surviving 
funds and the average return of all funds of a database within a year.323 
Liang (2000) found “that the average survivorship bias of hedge funds is over 2% per 
year.”324 He based this result on the HFR database and the Trading Advisors 
Selection System (TASS) database as he analyzed funds of these two databases 
between 1994 and 1998.325 
Gregoriou (2003) discovered that most large hedge funds survive longer than small 
hedge funds and that the median lifetime of hedge funds is 5.5 years. He based his 
findings on the Zurich Capital Markets database as he analyzed funds of this 
database between 1990 and 2001.326 
Several data providers now retain historical figures about funds that were liquidated 
or stopped reporting due to other reasons; hence survivorship bias will gradually 
disappear in the future.327 
 
6.3 Backfill Bias 
Backfill bias occurs when funds that join a given database have the permission to 
backfill their past returns, even though they have not been part of this database in 
previous years. The permission of backfilling grants hedge fund managers the option 
to decide on when to be incorporated into the database and if they want to include 
the data partly or in total into the hedge funds track record.328 
According to Barry (2002) 80% of hedge funds backfill “at least 6 months of data, 
around 65% of all funds backfill by at least 12 months and around 50% backfill by 
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 more than two years.”329 Data is usually biased upwards, when database providers 
backfill returns of funds330 and according to Barry (2002) the yearly backfill bias is on 
average 1.4%. He analyzed hedge funds of the TASS database between 1994 and 
2001.331  
 
6.4 Infrequent Pricing 
A further severe problem of hedge fund databases is the typical tendency of 
managers to represent “optimally their monthly net asset value in order to smooth 
their returns.”332 For example, if a hedge fund holds a security that does not trade on 
the first or “last days of the month, the manager will often assign a price, which could 
be the price at which the security”333 traded last “or, worse, a price which the 
manager thinks is reasonable.”334 
If managers tend to smooth their returns consciously or unconsciously, it usually 
results in a systematic overstatement of the returns. The two types of hedge funds 
where this problem occurs most frequently are hedge funds that hold illiquid 
securities and U.S. onshore limited partnerships. The estimation of accurate net 
asset values of illiquid assets is often difficult and therefore subjectivity might 
influence the pricing decision. The majority of U.S. onshore limited partnerships value 
their portfolio on their own which often leads to infrequent pricing.335 
Another bias that can occur is the multi-period sampling bias which arises if the 
analyzed historical period is too short.336 According to Ackermann et al. (1999) an 
estimation period should at least consist of 24 monthly observations when risk-
adjusted returns and risk are measured.337 
In my opinion there will be a reduction in biases as there are going to be more 
regulated reporting requirements in the future. 
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 7. Hedge Funds in the Subprime Credit Crisis 
Even though the subprime credit crisis originated in 2007 its consequences started to 
have a strong impact in 2008. The following industry overview shall give an 
explanation on how this financial crisis influenced the hedge fund industry. 
 
7.1 Industry Overview 
According to IFSL “assets under management of the hedge fund industry fell by 
nearly 30% in 2008 to US$1,500 billion.”338 This happened to be the largest decline 
in the hedge fund industry on record and seems to be the result of fund liquidations, 
a rush of redemptions, and negative fund performances in 2008.339 Figure 12 
illustrates this. 
 
Source: Maslakovic (2009), p. 1 Figure 12: Number and Assets 
under Management of Global 
Hedge Funds 
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 Some hedge funds, especially in the U.S., suspended redemptions in the last months 
of 2008,340 which led to a further decline in industry assets to US$1,300 billion in the 
first half of 2009.341 The decline in assets in 2008 was almost evenly divided between 
asset outflows and negative performance.342 
According to the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index, hedge funds lost on 
average 19.1% in 2008. In spite of the losses, hedge funds outperformed several 
underlying markets as for instance the S&P 500 Index which dropped by 37%.343 
Major losses accrued between September and November 2008 as U.S. and 
European banks collapsed, bans on short selling were introduced, equity markets fell 
and the urgency to liquidate positions in order to meet redemption and margin calls 
grew. 13.2% of hedge funds overall assets were returned to investors in 2008. 
Investors were afraid of even bigger losses and therefore turned to less risky 
investments which led to an annual net outflow of funds. During January and 
February 2009 another US$115 billion have been returned to investors.344 
Moreover, the amount of hedge funds declined by 10% to around 10,000 hedge 
funds in 2008 (see figure 12). Most closures occurred in the last months of 2008 
which also led to a decrease in employment to about 150,000 people in the 
worldwide hedge fund industry. In 2007 the hedge fund industry counted 6% more 
employees.345 
In section 3.7 I already pointed out the various possibilities to register hedge funds as 
well as the fact that about half of the hedge funds were registered onshore and the 
other half was registered offshore at the end of 2008. The Cayman Islands was the 
most used offshore location and the U.S. was favoured as onshore location.346  
The management of hedge funds was and still is predominately located onshore; the 
U.S. being the favourite domicile. More than two-thirds of all hedge fund assets were 
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 managed from the U.S. at the end of 2008. In comparison to the year 2002 this is a 
severe decline of assets under management in the U.S. as shown in figure 13.347 
 
Figure 13: Management Location 
of Global Hedge Fund Assets 
Source: Maslakovic (2009), p. 2 
 
At the end of 2008 the two most important hedge fund management locations were 
New York (48% of hedge fund management activities) and London with estimated 
18% of the global hedge fund management activities. In 2008 about 1,300 hedge 
funds were based in Europe. Around two-thirds were placed in London. London is 
still a very popular location for hedge funds as it has great local expertise and a good 
infrastructure including a high density of prime brokerage, administration, and 
custody and auditing firms.348 
“Institutional investors have overtaken high net worth individuals for the first time to 
become the biggest source of assets for hedge funds in 2008.”349 It is likely that this 
will have a significant effect on the regulation in the industry of hedge funds as 
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 institutional investors will increase the regulation and have an impact on hedge funds’ 
actions. 
During the last years the industry of hedge funds has become strongly centralized at 
the top end, hence a small number of hedge funds holds a large portion of the 
industries total assets. In 2008 the 100 biggest hedge funds held about three-
quarters of the total industry assets which is a big increase in comparison with past 
years, as for instance, in 2003 the top 100 funds owned 54% of the industries’ total 
assets.350 
At the end of 2008 the largest hedge fund was Bridgewater Associates with US$38 
billion under management. Second and third were JP Morgan and Paulson & Co with 
US$33 billion and US$29 billion, respectively.351 
10% of the hedge funds disappeared from the market in 2008 which is an attrition 
rate that is significantly higher compared to the previous ten years where the rate 
was in a range between 3 and 5%.352 
The most applied hedge fund strategy in January 2009 was the event driven strategy, 
representing 27% of all hedge funds. In January 2008 the long/short equity strategy 
was the most applied strategy as it represented 30% of all hedge funds. It declined 
significantly between January 2008 and January 2009 as it represented only 23% of 
all hedge funds in January 2009.The global macro sector increased by 5% between 
January 2008 and January 2009.353 Figure 14 indicates the frequency of every hedge 
fund strategy in January 2009. 
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Figure 14: Frequency of each 
Hedge Fund Strategy in January 
2009 
Source: http://www.hedgeindex.com 
 
The prime brokerage business was also negatively affected by the financial crisis of 
2008 as the liquidation rate of hedge funds strongly increased, hedge fund assets 
severely declined, and many hedge funds decreased leverage. A big portion of prime 
brokers’ income results from lending cash to support leverage; hence the decrease in 
leverage of hedge funds was harmful for prime brokers. In 2008 the largest prime 
brokers in terms of the number of clients were JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and 
Morgan Stanley, each accounting for about 10% of the market.354 
Some hedge funds outsource fund administration functions, such as investor 
services, accounting, or risk analysis. The industry for firms which take over the 
hedge fund administration declined around 30% in 2008, after increasing consistently 
over the previous ten years. The largest hedge fund administration providers in 2008 
were Citco Fund Services, Goldman Sachs Administration Services, and State Street 
Alternative Investment Solutions.355 
Generally, it can be established that the hedge fund industry consistently grew until 
2007 but strongly diminished in 2008 in all its facets as a result of the subprime credit 
crisis. 
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 7.2 Short Selling in the Subprime Credit Crisis 
According to Charoenrook et al. (2008) the permission of short selling in markets 
enhances the market quality. In their empirical study they stated that the restriction of 
short selling does not increase the probability of a market crash but it increases the 
volatility of aggregate stock returns and decreases the liquidity in markets.356 
In section 3.1 I pointed out the unpopularity of short selling, yet one should not forget 
its positive effects on markets (increase of liquidity and facilitation of information 
transfer)357 and that it contributes to price efficiency.358 
Still, the subprime credit crisis demanded decisions to protect the quality and integrity 
of securities markets and to strengthen investors’ confidence. On September 19th, 
2008 the SEC “took temporary emergency action to prohibit short selling in financial 
companies”359. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox stated, 
“The Commission is committed to using every weapon in its arsenal to combat 
market manipulation that threatens investors and capital markets. The emergency 
order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks will restore equilibrium 
to markets. This action, which would not be necessary in a well-functioning 
market, is temporary in nature and part of the comprehensive set of steps being 
taken by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the Congress.”360 
The SEC prohibited short selling in 799 financial companies until October 2nd, 2008 
and if needed the ban would have been extended, lasting 30 calendar days at 
most.361 In the end the ban on short selling expired on October 8th, 2008 and was 
generally criticised as it added confusion to the market and did not help to halt the 
slide of financial stocks.362  
According to Charles Jones, a professor at Columbia Business School, the ban on 
short selling gave financial stocks an artificial support for only a short duration. 
During the duration of the ban the Dow Jones Industrial Index fell almost 19%. Arturo 
Bris, a professor at the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) is 
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 conducting a survey on the ban on short selling in the recent financial crisis and early 
evidence from the study shows that the ban was counterproductive. He considers 
short sellers as a cushion and that the market dropped even more by prohibiting 
short selling.363 
Also U.S. hedge funds disliked the restriction of short selling and America’s largest 
hedge fund lobbying group, the Managed Funds Association (MFA), begged 
regulators to reconsider the ban on short selling. In a letter to the SEC on September 
21st, 2008 the MFA asked to readjust the rule to permit hedging and indicated that in 
their opinion the causes of the financial crisis were not short selling activities but poor 
risk management, lending and disclosure decisions made by financial institutions in 
the past.364 
Two further actions of the SEC to address the difficult market situation were: 
• Institutional money managers were required to report new short sales of 
particular publicly traded securities. 
• A temporary easing of restrictions for securities issuers to buy back their own 
securities.365 
The U.K. Financial Services Authority took a similar action as the SEC just one day 
before the SEC had banned short selling. It introduced the ban on short selling on 
September 18th, 2008366 and lifted it on January 16th, 2009.367 
The Alternative Investment Management Society welcomed the abolishment of the 
ban on short sales in stocks of the 34 financial institutions. According to its chief 
executive Andrew Baker the ban did not achieve its estimated aims, although he 
supports efforts of regulators and policymakers to achieve better stability in markets, 
especially during emergency conditions.368 
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 According to Eurekahedge369, worldwide hedge funds lost 4.67% of their value in 
September 2008, see table 3. 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec YTD 
2009 0.28 -0.76 1.28* n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.79  
2008 -2.14 2.49 -1.86 1.30 1.74 -0.58 -2.05 -1.30 -4.67 -4.88 -1.19 0.72 -12.00 
2007 1.26 0.69 0.80 1.97 2.14 1.20 0.75 -1.41 2.99 2.92 -1.38 0.92 13.52  
2006 3.38 0.50 2.06 2.14 -1.45 -0.32 -0.11 0.99 0.14 1.83 2.25 1.65 13.76  
2005 -0.16 1.82 -0.61 -1.21 1.11 1.56 1.74 0.99 2.19 -1.09 2.15 2.14 11.06  
2004 1.78 1.65 0.83 -1.40 -0.36 0.32 -0.57 0.08 1.70 1.08 2.93 1.35 9.73  
2003 1.28 0.67 -0.24 2.50 3.69 1.13 1.24 2.02 1.33 2.59 0.94 2.08 20.95  
2002 0.79 -0.12 1.79 0.63 1.07 0.03 -1.05 0.95 -0.29 0.36 1.69 1.16 7.18  
2001 2.89 -0.24 0.58 1.15 1.73 0.71 -0.28 0.61 -1.08 2.00 1.00 1.67 11.25  
2000 1.52 5.49 1.58 -1.22 0.03 2.44 0.32 3.71 -0.26 -0.15 -0.52 3.48 17.46  
Table 3: Monthly hedge fund 
returns from January 2000 to 
March 2009 
     Source: http://www.eurekahedge.com 
 
Since Eurekahedge started collecting data in 2000 this was the biggest monthly loss 
so far and the first time that the sector of hedge funds performed an annual loss in 
the history of Eurekahedge. It is assumed that the ban on short selling and the high 
volatility in markets were the main reasons for the strongly declining hedge fund 
returns in September 2008.370 
I conclude from the above information that the ban on short selling did not help to 
recover markets in the subprime credit crisis.371 
 
7.3 Changes in the Legal Environment due to the Subprime Credit 
Crisis 
I already mentioned the restrictions on short selling that were introduced as a 
consequence of the financial crisis, yet more changes in the legal environment are to 
come for both hedge fund managers and hedge funds.372 Compared to the 
restrictions on short selling which were temporary actions, the other recommended 
rules introduced in this part of my thesis will likely be long-term actions. I am chiefly 
going to explain the upcoming changes in U.S. laws that influence hedge funds since 
the U.S. is the country where most of the hedge fund activities are occurring. Apart 
                                                                  
369 Link: http://www.eurekahedge.com/indices/default.asp, accessed: 08/04/09 
370 Timesonline, link: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article4996136.ece, 
accessed: 08/04/09 
371 Karmin et al. (2008) 
372 Cohen et al. (2009) 
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 from that recent history shows that the U.S. is a country which is very active in finding 
ways to improve the regulation of financial markets and hedge funds. 
According to the President of the United States Barack Obama, hedge funds are 
entities that have to be subject to “proper oversight”373 and he “called for a new, 21st 
century regulatory framework to restore accountability, transparency, and trust in our 
financial markets.”374 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was established to charge the 
administration with reviewing current states of the regulatory system and of the 
financial markets. Besides that, the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 
was created by President Obama on February 6th, 2009 to analyze and inform about 
operations and regulations of the banking and financial system.375 
The Group of Thirty which is a consultative group on international economic and 
monetary affairs released a report, which focuses on recommended changes in the 
global framework of the financial regulation, on January 15th, 2009. This report is 
intended for policymakers of all countries which experienced damage due to the 
financial crisis. On the regulation of private pools of capital such as hedge funds the 
report recommends:376 
“a. Managers of private pools of capital that employ substantial borrowed funds 
should be required to register with an appropriate national prudential regulator. 
There should be some minimum size and venture capital exemptions from such 
registration requirement. 
b. The prudential regulator of such managers should have authority to require 
periodic regulatory reports and public disclosures of appropriate information 
regarding the size, investment style, borrowing, and performance of the funds 
under management. Since introduction of even a modest system of registration 
and regulation can create a false impression of lower investment risk, disclosure, 
and suitability standards will have to be reevaluated. 
                                                                  
373 Cohen et al. (2009) 
374 Obama (2008), link: http://www.barackobama.com/2008/09/16/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_113.php, accessed: 
13/04/09 
375 Cohen et al. (2009) 
376 The Group of Thirty (2009), link: http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf, accessed: 13/04/09 
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 c. For funds above a size judged to be potentially systemically significant, the 
prudential regulator should have authority to establish appropriate standards for 
capital, liquidity, and risk management. 
d. For these purposes, the jurisdiction of the appropriate prudential regulator 
should be based on the primary business location of the manager of such funds, 
regardless of the legal domicile of the funds themselves. Given the global nature 
of the markets in which such managers and funds operate, it is imperative that a 
regulatory framework be applied on an internationally consistent basis.”377 
In my opinion all the recommendations to improve the regulation of hedge funds 
make sense and will in some ways be soon included in the laws of many countries or 
even in one international rule. Especially the idea to regulate hedge funds in those 
countries where they execute most business activities and not where the funds’ legal 
domicile itself is will have a positive impact even though this situation will definitely 
demand an international legal environment since it will not be possible to restrict 
hedge fund actions to specific countries. 
According to Cohen et al. (2009) the recommendations also have some weak points 
as they are only applied to hedge funds which have a minimum size and which use 
potential borrowed funds. Even though the goal of the recommendations is to avoid 
systematic risk which is “the risk of a broad-based breakdown in the financial 
system”378 occurring from overleveraging of large hedge funds there are no 
recommendations on the ratio of leverage. The recommendations attempt to lower 
systematic risk by obligating hedge funds to public disclosures of key information.379 
For hedge funds this might end harmful hence they will again seek exemptions. 
The recommendations are very general and do not go into detail at all which might 
help hedge funds to find loopholes if laws are not going to be developed in detail.380 
On January 29th, 2009 an updated proposition on hedge fund regulation has been 
presented by the U.S. Congress. The so-called Hedge Fund Transparency Act is a 
bill which obligates hedge funds and other private investment companies with more 
than US$50 million of assets under management to disclose with the SEC. This act 
                                                                  
377 The Group of Thirty (2009), link: http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf, p. 9, accessed: 13/04/09 
378 Lo (2008), p. 3 
379 Cohen et al. (2009) 
380 Cohen et al. (2009) 
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 would remove loopholes which hedge funds used earlier to escape the Investment 
Company Act.381 
On March 26th, 2009 the administration released the framework for regulatory 
reform382 which also focuses on the financial systems’ systematic risk and suggests 
regulating entities. According to the administration there should only be one regulator 
of systematic risk which should supervise firms “based on what they do and not the 
form they take.”383 
The administration defined systematically important firms which might also include 
hedge funds by the following 3 characteristics: 
• “The financial system's interdependence with the firm; 
• The firm's size, leverage (including off-balance sheet exposures), and degree 
of reliance on short-term funding; 
• The firm's importance as a source of credit for households, businesses, and 
governments and as a source of liquidity for the financial system.”384 
Apart from that, the administration also proposed new rules for hedge funds: 
1. “Requiring Registration of All Hedge Funds: All advisers to hedge funds (and 
other private pools of capital, including private equity funds and venture capital 
funds) whose assets under management exceed a certain threshold should be 
required to register with the SEC. 
2. Mandating Investor and Counterparty Disclosure: All such funds advised by an 
SEC-registered investment adviser should be subject to investor and 
counterparty disclosure requirements and regulatory reporting requirements. 
3. Providing Information Necessary to Assess Threats to Financial Stability: The 
regulatory reporting requirements for such funds should require reporting, on a 
confidential basis, information necessary to assess whether the fund or fund 
family is so large or highly leveraged that it poses a threat to financial stability. 
                                                                  
381 Cohen et al. (2009) 
382 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009), link: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm, accessed: 13/04/09 
383 Cohen et al. (2009), link: http://www.finalternatives.com/node/7460, accessed: 13/04/09 
384 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009), link: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm, accessed: 13/04/09 
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 4. Sharing Reports With Systemic Risk Regulator: The SEC should share the 
reports that it receives from the funds with the systemic risk regulator, which 
would then determine whether any hedge”385 fund “could pose a systemic 
threat and should be subjected to the prudential standards outlined above.”386 
To me it seems that the approach towards controlling systematic risk is a start in the 
right direction even though the hedge fund lobby might not be pleased by this action 
of the administration.  
According to the U.S. Treasury Secretary other regulatory reforms for investor and 
consumer protection will be introduced.387 The changes in the regulation of hedge 
funds will be a global movement which also encourages the interactions between 
countries and will soon lead to an enhanced regulatory system. 
The most important aspect of a newly revised regulatory framework will be its 
gapless oversight and regulation of financial products, participants and markets 
without any exceptions and disregarding of the country of domicile. Especially private 
investment pools such as hedge funds which contain severe systematic risk have to 
be regulated efficiently.388 
 
7.4 Performance of Hedge Funds in the Subprime Credit Crisis 
The following performance evaluation of hedge funds is based on the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund database which was established in 1994.389 I illustrate 
performance data from January 2007 (the subprime credit crisis started in February 
2007) until June 2009. These performance data are compared to the S&P 500 Index 
and the MSCI World Index390 in order to find out the differences in the performance 
of a hedge fund index and stock market indices. I also connect the data to events in 
the subprime credit crisis in order to find out which event might have triggered 
changes in the indices. 
                                                                  
385 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009), link: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm, accessed: 13/04/09 
386 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009), link: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm, accessed: 13/04/09 
387 Cohen et al. (2009) 
388 Cohen et al. (2009) 
389 Lhabitant (2004) 
390 The MSCI World Index “is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed markets. As of June 2007 the 
MSCI World Index consisted” (MSCI Barra) of the market indices of 23 developed countries. (MSCI Barra, link: 
http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/international_equity_indices/definitions.html#WORLD, accessed: 22/01/10) 
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 7.4.1 The Database 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont database which follows track records of over 5000 funds 
is used to establish the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index. This database 
only includes funds with at least US$50 million of assets under management, audited 
financial statements and a track record of at least 12 months. The index is calculated 
monthly and the returns are expressed net of all expenses and performance fees.391 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index is an asset-weighted index.392 In 
comparison to an equal-weighted index, an asset-weighted index “provides a more 
accurate depiction of an investment in the asset class.”393  
As illustrated in figure 6 on page 30, Credit Suisse/Tremont divides hedge funds into 
ten primary categories of investment styles. The event driven strategy is further 
divided into the distressed category, the multi-strategy category and the risk arbitrage 
category. The Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund database minimizes the 
survivorship bias by not removing funds “from the index until they are fully liquidated 
or fail to meet the financial reporting requirements.”394 
 
7.4.2 Hedge Fund Performance in 2007 
As stated in table 4, the three best performing types of hedge funds in 2007 were 
funds investing in emerging markets, global macro funds and multi-strategy funds. 
The three worst performing types of hedge funds were fixed income arbitrage funds, 
convertible arbitrage funds and managed futures.395 
 
 
                                                                  
391 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/secure/de/indexperformance.aspx?cy=USD&indexname=HEDG, accessed: 05/05/09 
392 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/secure/de/indexperformance.aspx?cy=USD&indexname=HEDG, accessed: 05/11/09 
393 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/en/indexmethodology.aspx?cy=USD&indexname=HEDG, accessed: 11/11/09 
394 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/en/indexmethodology.aspx?cy=USD&indexname=HEDG, accessed: 13/11/09 
395 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS_Tremont_Hedge_Fund_Index_2007_Year_in_Review.pdf, accessed: 
22/01/10 
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 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index Return in 2007 12.56% 
 
Best performing hedge fund strategies in the first half of 2007 
Emerging Markets 20.26% 
Global Macro  17.36% 
Multi-Strategy  16.82% 
Worst performing hedge fund strategies in 2007 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  3.83% 
Convertible Arbitrage  5.17% 
Managed Futures 6.01% 
Stock Market Indices Performance in 2007 
S&P 500 5.49% 
MSCI World 8.6%396  
Table 4: Index Returns in 2007 Source: http://www.hedgeindex.com
 
All hedge fund strategies performed positively in 2007. The Credit Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Index gained 12.56%, while having a volatility of 1.5%. In the same 
period the S&P 500 Index gained only 5.49% while having a volatility of 2.9%. The 
only strategy which had a lower risk and a higher return than the overall Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index was the global macro strategy. The global macro 
strategy took advantage of large amplitudes in the currency market, in the cost of 
energy and gold prices. Returns in 2007 showed unusually high volatility levels. 
Besides the managed futures strategy and the convertible arbitrage strategy all other 
strategies perceived higher volatility in 2007 compared to the average volatility of the 
5 year period ending December 2006.397 
 
Events influencing the markets in 2007 
Some hedge funds, which invested large portions of their assets in securities tied to 
subprime mortgages, collapsed in the summer of 2007 as the values of these 
securities dropped extensively. Despite this turmoil in the second and third quarter of 
2007 the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index returned 5.2% since other hedge 
funds took advantage of strong stock markets and positive economic outlooks. Even 
though two hedge funds in the fixed income arbitrage sector collapsed, the overall 
return by this sector was positive and equalled 1.5% in the second quarter of 2007. In 
the third quarter of 2007 the pressure for liquidity forced many hedge funds to reduce 
                                                                  
396 Cumulative monthly returns from January 2007 until November 2007. 
397 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS_Tremont_Hedge_Fund_Index_2007_Year_in_Review.pdf, accessed: 
22/01/10 
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 leverage and to liquidate positions which created a market environment that 
challenged the hedge fund industry. However the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund 
Index returned 1.1% while 7 out of 10 strategies performed positively during the third 
quarter of 2007.398  
In the fourth quarter the U.S. housing market “downturned” further and the 
subsequent credit squeeze increased the probability of a recession. Due to the 
outcome of a US$40 billion loss because of further defaults of subprime creditors, 
Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke recognized that tightened financial 
conditions could hurt the economy.399 Despite these circumstances the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index returned 2%, all 10 hedge fund sectors being 
positive in the fourth quarter of 2007. The Emerging Markets Sector returned 3.8% 
since investors were looking for opportunities in Asia and Latin America with only 
limited correlation to the U.S. economy.400 
In spite of the credit crunch in 2007 and increased borrowing rates, hedge funds 
were still able to attract capital to allow themselves an active leveraging of positions. 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index performed more consistently than 
many leading equity indices, including S&P 500, MSCI World or the Dow Jones 
Industrial Index. Well-diversified assets contributed to the better performance and 
lower volatility.401 
 
7.4.3 Hedge Fund Performance in 2008  
As illustrated in table 5, the three best performing hedge fund strategies in 2008 were 
the managed futures strategy, the dedicated short bias strategy and the risk arbitrage 
                                                                  
398 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS_Tremont_Hedge_Fund_Index_2007_Year_in_Review.pdf, accessed: 
22/01/10 
399 Federal Reserve, link: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071129a.htm, accessed: 24/01/10 
400 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS_Tremont_Hedge_Fund_Index_2007_Year_in_Review.pdf, accessed: 
24/01/10 
401 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS_Tremont_Hedge_Fund_Index_2007_Year_in_Review.pdf, accessed: 
24/01/10 
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 strategy. The three worst performing strategies were the equity market neutral 
strategy, the convertible arbitrage strategy and the emerging markets strategy.402 
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index Return in 2008 -19.1% 
 
Best performing hedge fund strategies in 2008 
Managed Futures 18.3% 
Dedicated Short Bias 14.9% 
Risk Arbitrage -3.27% 
Worst performing hedge fund strategies in 2008 
Equity Market Neutral -40.3% 
Convertible Arbitrage -31.6% 
Emerging Markets -30.4% 
Stock Market Indices Performance in 2008 
S&P 500 -37.0% 
MSCI World -42.1% 
Table 5: Index Returns in 2008 Source: http://www.hedgeindex.com
 
In the year 2008 the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index declined by 19% 
while having a volatility of 2.8%. In the same year the S&P 500 Index dropped by 
37% while having a volatility of 6.1% and the MSCI World Index dropped by 42.1% 
while having a volatility of 6.8%. As stock markets fell, many investors shifted their 
investments to fixed income categories as bond markets. This had a positive effect 
on the overall bond market. For instance the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond 
Index403 showed a gain of 5% while having a volatility of 1.8% in 2008. The biggest 
drop of the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index occurred in the months 
September and October. Even though it declined tremendously in 2008 it still 
outperformed broad equity indices as hedge funds maintained considerably less 
volatility. As the overall hedge fund industry performed negatively, the managed 
futures strategy and the dedicated short bias strategy were the only two strategies 
with positive returns. The managed futures strategy returned 18.3% and the 
dedicated short bias strategy returned 14.9%.404 
 
                                                                  
402 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Hedge%20Fund%2008%20Recap_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 24/01/10 
403 “Barclays Aggregate Bond Index: A combination of several bond indexes, Barclays indexes are among the most widely used 
benchmarks of bond market total returns.” (Standard & Poor’s, link: 
http://fc.standardandpoors.com/srl/srl_v35/library_article.jsp?tid=0005#004, accessed: 24/01/10) 
404 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Hedge%20Fund%2008%20Recap_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 24/01/10 
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 Events influencing the market in 2008 
The credit market squeeze that began in 2007 intensified during 2008. In addition to 
this underlying trend, 2008 showed further unprecedented market events, which led 
to an extraordinary market volatility and finally also to government interventions on a 
concerted international basis to prevent the banking system of collapsing by floating 
markets with liquidity and cutting interest rates.405  
Lehman Brothers controlled about “5% of the global prime brokerage business”406 
before it filed for bankruptcy on September 15th 2008.407 Its bankruptcy hit small 
funds that relied on fewer prime brokers harder than large funds which usually have a 
bigger diversification of prime brokers.408  
The fall of Bear Stearns occurring in September 2008 as well, was the first of a 
number of crucial events in the banking sector. The following events were the 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, the approval of Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley to change from investment banks to commercial banks, and the end 
of their “stand-alone broker-dealer model.”409 The U.S. government had to bail out 
the Federal National Mortgage Association and Freddie Mac as the U.S. housing 
market continued the downturn.410  
All the events stated above happened in September and October 2008 which caused 
a sharp fall in equity indices. The MSCI World Index lost 31.1% in September and 
October 2008 whereas the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index lost only 12% 
during those two months. “The Volatility Index (VIX), a common measure of market 
risk, experienced its largest swing on record in the third quarter after jumping 40 
                                                                  
405 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Hedge%20Fund%2008%20Recap_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 24/01/10 
406 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
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 points between beginning of September and end of October.”411 The VIX, the 
performance of the MSCI World Index and the performance of the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index are illustrated in figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Volatility Index, MSCI World Index 
and Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index 
Source: www.hedgeindex.com412  
                         
 
The best and the worst performing hedge fund strategies of 2008 in detail 
Hedge funds in the managed futures sector usually perform well during downturns of 
markets. When the LTCM fund collapsed between August 1998 and August 1999 the 
managed futures strategy showed a 16% return. During March 2001 and March 2003 
it gained 28%, as the technology bubble burst and the crisis of September 11th 
occurred. In 2008, funds with a managed futures strategy generally benefited from 
long exposure to US dollar trades and treasury bonds as well as short exposure to 
stocks and commodities.413  
                                         
411 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Hedge%20Fund%2008%20Recap_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 24/01/10 
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accessed: 24/01/10 
413 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
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 The significant downturn in stock markets resulted in a strong positive return for 
funds with a dedicated short bias strategy. This sector returned 14.9% in 2008, as 
shown in table 5.414 
All other strategies performed negative returns in 2008.  
The equity market neutral sector lost 40.3% in 2008. The losses occurred primarily 
due to the scandal of Bernard Madoff, as he managed some hedge funds with this 
strategy. Bernard Madoff “was sued by the SEC for an alleged multi-billion dollar 
Ponzi scheme”415, 416 on December 11th, 2008. Before the Bernard Madoff scandal, 
equity market neutral funds performed only slightly negatively in 2008.417  
Funds in the emerging market sector lost 30.4% in 2008 as commodity prices fell, the 
US dollar strengthened and emerging stock markets fell around the world. However, 
in December this sector performed positively as emerging markets currencies 
strengthened because of efforts to improve conditions. Another factor that helped 
improving the performance of the emerging markets strategy in December 2008 and 
further on in 2009 were the decreasing inflation rates which had reached record lows. 
This helped to boost spending as well as it strengthened the economies of emerging 
market nations.418  
 
7.4.4 Hedge Fund Performance in the first half of 2009 
As illustrated in table 6, the three best performing types of hedge funds in the first 
half of 2009 were convertible arbitrage funds, emerging markets funds and multi-
strategy funds. The three worst performing types of hedge funds were dedicated 
                                                                  
414 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Hedge%20Fund%2008%20Recap_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 24/01/10 
415 “A Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds 
contributed by new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities 
claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on attracting new money to 
make promised payments to earlier-stage investors and to use for personal expenses, instead of engaging in any legitimate 
investment activity.” (SEC, link: http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm, accessed: 10/05/10) 
416 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Hedge%20Fund%2008%20Recap_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 24/01/10 
417 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
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accessed: 24/01/10 
418 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
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 short bias funds, funds with a managed futures strategy and equity market neutral 
funds.419 
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index Return in the first half of 2009 7.2% 
 
Best performing hedge fund strategies in the first half of 2009 
Convertible Arbitrage 23.9% 
Emerging Markets 13.2% 
Multi-Strategy 12.3% 
Worst performing hedge fund strategies in 2009 
Dedicated Short Bias -10.8% 
Managed Futures  -7.4% 
Equity Market Neutral 1.1% 
Stock Market Indices Performance in 2009 
S&P 500 3.2% 
MSCI World 4.8% 
Table 6: Index Returns in the first half of 2009 Source: http://www.hedgeindex.com 
 
The actions introduced by governments in 2008 proved to be effective. The Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index performed 7.2% in the first half of 2009. Hedge 
funds have been able to reposition themselves and 80% of the funds performed 
positively in the second quarter of 2009. Investors shifted towards more risky 
investments and many hedge fund managers took the opportunity to buy valuable 
securities that have been oversold. In the first quarter of 2009 the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index finished slightly positive with a return of 0.9%. 
Many major equity markets performed double digit losses in the first quarter of 2009. 
For instance the S&P 500 Index returned -11%. However, in the second quarter of 
2009 equity markets recovered and most of them returned significant gains. The S&P 
500 Index returned 15.9% and outperformed the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund 
Index as it returned 6.2%. During the beginning of the second quarter of 2009, hedge 
funds maintained relatively defensive positions to limit the effects of high volatility and 
financial disturbance on their funds. Still, in May 2009 the Credit Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Index returned 4.1% which was the highest return within the last nine 
years. The high return in May 2009 can be explained by the increased affinity of 
hedge fund managers towards higher risk taking. Overall hedge funds outperformed 
equity and bond markets during the first six months of 2009, while maintaining lower 
                                                                  
419 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Mid%20Year%20Hedge%20Analysis_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 24/01/10 
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 volatility. During the first two quarters of 2009 the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund 
Index had a volatility of 1.7% and the S&P 500 Index had a volatility of 8.7%. Eight of 
the ten hedge fund strategy sectors performed positive returns during the first six 
months of 2009.420  
The convertible arbitrage sector was the best performing sector, as it returned 
23.9%. The significant increase in returns compared to the year before when it lost 
31.6% happened due to the profits from “mispricings” and also from new issuances 
of convertible securities.421 
Optimism about global recovery led to a rise in commodities prices and strongly 
performing stock markets in developing nations in the first half of 2009. This had a 
positive effect on hedge funds with an emerging markets strategy and enforced 
managers of this strategy to increase the risk in their investments. Consequently they 
were rewarded with positive returns in the first and second quarter of 2009.422 
 
7.4.5 Summary of the Performance Analysis 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index outperformed the MSCI World Index 
and the S&P 500 Index in 2007, 2008 and the first half of 2009, while having had a 
lower volatility in each of the 3 periods.423 When the turmoil of the subprime credit 
crisis had reached its peak in September and October 2008, the MSCI World Index 
decreased by 31.1% and the S&P 500 Index decreased by 24.8%. In comparison to 
equity market indices hedge funds were on average able to limit their losses during 
those two months as the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index returned -12%.424  
                                                                  
420 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Mid%20Year%20Hedge%20Analysis_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 26/01/10 
421 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Mid%20Year%20Hedge%20Analysis_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 26/01/10 
422 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Mid%20Year%20Hedge%20Analysis_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 26/01/10 
423 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: http://www.hedgeindex.com, accessed: 28/01/10 
424 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Hedge%20Fund%2008%20Recap_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 28/01/10 
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 Overall, more than one out of every five hedge funds in the Credit Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Index performed positively in 2008.425 The majority of these funds were 
funds with a dedicated short bias strategy or funds with a managed futures strategy 
as these two strategies usually perform well during market downturns. In 2008 the 
managed futures sector returned 18.3% and the dedicated short bias sector returned 
14.9%.426 
In the first half of 2009 hedge funds have been able to reposition themselves and the 
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index returned 7.2%. It outperformed the MSCI 
World Index and the S&P 500 Index as these returned 4.8% and 3.2%, respectively. 
Despite that, equity market indices rallied in the second quarter of 2009 and 
outperformed the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index as hedge funds 
maintained relatively defensive positions.427  
 
                                                                  
425 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
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 8. Conclusions 
As hedge funds only held a small portion of mortgage-backed securities when the 
subprime credit crisis emerged in 2007, they were not considered to be the trigger of 
the crisis. However, the general assumption is that trading activities of hedge funds 
increased financial instability in 2008428 which resulted in the development of new 
regulatory frameworks. Most of the recommended changes in the regulatory 
frameworks aim to increase the transparency of hedge funds. Especially hedge funds 
which might have an influence on the systematic risk of financial markets will face 
more detailed reporting requirements on their investment style, their size, their 
amount of borrowed funds and their performance.429 The approach towards 
controlling systematic risk and increasing reporting requirements for hedge funds is a 
start in the right direction although hedge fund managers will dislike the increase in 
regulation as they try to keep their strategies as secret as possible.430 An additional 
advantage of the increase in hedge fund regulation might be the increase in 
confidence of investors which could attract new capital towards hedge fund 
investments.431 
This thesis concludes that during the subprime credit crisis investments in hedge 
funds have on average been better investment decisions than investments in equity 
market indices. As hedge funds are actively managed by hedge fund managers it 
allowed better protection against falling markets. Further many hedge fund managers 
repositioned their portfolios by “holding higher cash levels”432 and holding more 
defensive stocks, which led to a limitation of losses compared to equity market 
indices during the worst turmoil of the subprime credit crisis in 2008. In particular 
investments in hedge funds with a dedicated short bias strategy or a managed 
futures strategy were profitable investment decisions in 2008 as they performed 
significantly positively during the market downturn.433 
 
                                                                  
428 Maslakovic (2009) 
429 The Group of Thirty (2009), link: http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf, accessed: 13/04/09 
430 Ineichen (2003) 
431 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/CS%20Tremont%20Mid%20Year%20Hedge%20Analysis_Final.pdf, 
accessed: 26/01/10 
432 Rubin (2009), p. 2 
433 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index, link: 
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 10. Appendix: Abstract in German 
Diese Diplomarbeit behandelt Hedge Fonds und im Besonderen, Hedge Fonds in der 
Subprime-Kreditkrise. Diese Krise brach im Februar 2007 aus und beeinträchtigte 
neben der Weltwirtschaft auch die Hedge Fond Industrie. 
Nicht nur die Eigenschaften von Hedge Fonds, deren Klassifizierung und deren 
Bewertung werden in dieser Arbeit beschrieben sondern auch die Veränderungen 
der Hedge Fond Industrie durch die Subprime-Kreditkrise werden beleuchtet. 
Darüber hinaus wird ein Vergleich zwischen dem Ertrag eines Hedge Fond Indizes 
zu dem Ertrag von Aktienindizes während dieser Krise dargestellt.  
Hedge Fonds waren kein Auslöser der Subprime-Kreditkrise, da sie während des 
Ausbruchs der Krise in 2007 nur einen geringen Anteil ihres Vermögens in 
hypothekarisch gesicherten Wertpapieren angelegt hatten. Jedoch besteht die 
generelle Annahme, dass die Handelsaktivitäten von Hedge Fonds in 2008, 
Turbulenzen auf den internationalen Finanzmärkten auslösten.434 Diese Turbulenzen 
veranlassten nationale und internationale Organisationen zu reagieren und die 
rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen dieser Fonds zu überdenken. Die geplanten 
Änderungen in der rechtlichen Behandlung von Hedge Fonds zielen darauf ab, 
Hedge Fonds und deren Aktionen transparenter zu machen. Vor allem Hedge Fonds, 
die das systematische Risiko von Finanzmärkten beeinträchtigen werden genaueren 
Überwachungen unterzogen. 435  
Diese Arbeit kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Hedge Fonds während der Subprime-
Kreditkrise im Durchschnitt bessere Renditen erzielten als Aktienindizes. Das aktive 
Management dieser Fonds erlaubte ihnen sich gegen fallende Märkte 
abzusichern.436 Insbesondere Hedge Fonds mit „Dedicated Short Bias“ und 
„Managed Futures“ Strategien erzielten deutlich positive Renditen während den 
Turbulenzen auf den Finanzmärkten in 2008.437  
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